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fix(cli): guard URL file uploads against SSRF (#4319)
## Summary - route attacker-controlled URL sources and API-provided presigned upload destinations through the runtime-conditional core SSRF guard - expose that guard through a Node/workerd-aware core subpath - validate and revalidate DNS on redirects, pin Node and Bun connections to validated addresses, and preserve configured proxy routes - fail closed for user-chosen URL uploads in edge runtimes - cancel ignored response bodies and cover both upload boundaries at the public CLI pipeline - avoid adding `Content-Length: 0` to bodyless Bun GET requests ## Local reproduction On `next`, the CLI pipeline used bare `fetch` for both targets. A local loopback source and an internal presigned destination reached the network path. With this branch, the real `uploadToolInputFiles` pipeline blocks a `127.0.0.1` source before presigning and a `169.254.169.254` destination before sending bytes. A direct Bun proof also confirmed the pinned transport reaches a validated address without calling native `fetch`, while retaining the original Host header. Focused tests preserve native Bun fetch when an environment proxy is configured. ## Cross-SDK parity Python already applies public-address validation, redirect checks, DNS pinning, and response limits to URL uploads. Its focused URL-safety and upload suite remains green: 62 passed. No Python behavior change was needed. ## Verification - `pnpm build:packages`: 19 packages built - root `pnpm typecheck`: 14 package checks passed - TypeScript core: 53 files, 1,246 passed and 2 expected failures - focused core SSRF and pinned-transport tests: 31 passed - Python URL-safety/upload tests: 62 passed - real Bun execution of both CLI upload boundaries: blocked before presign/send - `git diff --check` The CLI Effect test file contains source and presigned-destination regressions and typechecks. Its local runner is blocked on current `next` by the repository-wide `@effect/vitest` config failure; hosted CLI checks exercise that boundary. ## Contributor context Supersedes [#4299](https://github.com/ComposioHQ/composio/pull/4299) · [Glen](https://app.tryglen.com/ComposioHQ/composio/pull/4299) after independently reproducing the attack path. The report is valid and useful, but the proposed root export hard-coded a Node module into an edge-capable package, its happy-path test did not execute the returned Effect, and it omitted destination protection, response cleanup, and Bun address pinning.