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Composio powers 1000+ toolkits, tool search, context management, authentication, and a sandboxed workbench to help you build AI agents that turn intent into action.

docs(changelog): normalize signature scheme list

The list mixed plain text (HMAC-SHA256, Ed25519) with a backtick'd internal identifier (token_match), which read inconsistently. Use plain prose for all three: "HMAC-SHA256, Ed25519, or shared-token matching depending on the toolkit". _(sent via Claude Code)_ Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Anshu Garg committed Apr 18, 2026 at 21:50 UTC aec45cb00d6a416f45dc52c73a6a2b7d8286aea6
1 file changed +1 -1
docs/content/changelog/04-18-26-webhook-triggers-v2.mdx
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@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ https://backend.composio.dev/api/v3/webhook_ingress/{toolkit}/{we_xxx}/trigger_e
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27 This replaces V1's shared `/handle` URL per toolkit. Events arriving on a V2 URL are fanned out only to trigger instances on that endpoint's project.
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29 -**Signature verification at ingress.** Composio cryptographically verifies every V2 request against the signing secret stored on the endpoint — HMAC-SHA256, Ed25519, or `token_match` depending on the toolkit. Unsigned or tampered payloads are rejected, so third parties cannot spoof events onto your triggers. For providers that sign a request timestamp (e.g. Slack), replay protection additionally rejects requests whose timestamp falls outside the allowed skew window.
29 +**Signature verification at ingress.** Composio cryptographically verifies every V2 request against the signing secret stored on the endpoint, using HMAC-SHA256, Ed25519, or shared-token matching depending on the toolkit. Unsigned or tampered payloads are rejected, so third parties cannot spoof events onto your triggers. For providers that sign a request timestamp (e.g. Slack), replay protection additionally rejects requests whose timestamp falls outside the allowed skew window.
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31 **Per-user authorization for app-level events.** On toolkits with per-user visibility — Slack being the first — V2 uses an app-level token (for Slack, an `xapp-…` token with `authorizations:read`) to resolve which connected users are authorized for a given event, so only those users' triggers fire. This underpins a new class of triggers for private channels, direct messages, and other per-recipient events, each routed only to the user the event was intended for.
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