@devries-cameron20 / composio-1 / commits / b6eeb8528
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Composio powers 1000+ toolkits, tool search, context management, authentication, and a sandboxed workbench to help you build AI agents that turn intent into action.

refactor(security): run SEC-316 containment check before mkdir

Reorder `FileDownloadable.download()` so the `is_relative_to()` containment check fires before `outdir.mkdir(parents=True)`, so a rejected payload doesn't leave the cache directory tree created as a side effect. `Path.resolve(strict=False)` (Python's default) resolves non-existent paths logically, so the check is well-defined without the directory existing first. No behavior change for accepted payloads.

jkomyno committed May 6, 2026 at 11:49 UTC b6eeb8528748709013091c881c6212e961c8f197
1 file changed +1 -1
python/composio/core/models/_files.py
+1 -1
@@ -554,12 +554,12 @@ class FileDownloadable(BaseModel):
554 # name like `output_evil/foo` (sibling-prefix attack) is also rejected.
555 safe_name = Path(self.name).name
556 outfile = outdir / safe_name
557 - outdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True, parents=True)
557 if not outfile.resolve().is_relative_to(outdir.resolve()):
558 raise ErrorDownloadingFile(
559 f"Path traversal detected: filename '{self.name}' resolves "
560 "outside the intended output directory."
561 )
562 + outdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True, parents=True)
563 response = requests.get(url=self.s3url, stream=True)
564 if response.status_code != 200:
565 raise ErrorDownloadingFile(f"Error downloading file: {self.s3url}")