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fix(python): block sensitive paths hidden by symlinks
jkomyno committed
Aug 25, 2026 at 20:49 UTC
43545ec8891c19eb2bee8345b53b3f96f45c70b9
2 files changed
+77
-25
python/composio/utils/sensitive_file_upload_paths.py
+34
-25
@@ -25,19 +25,26 @@ _DEFAULT_PRIVATE_KEY_BASENAME = re.compile(
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)
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-def _normalize_path_segments(file_path: t.Union[str, Path]) -> t.List[str]:
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- p = Path(file_path).expanduser()
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- try:
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- resolved = p.resolve()
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- except OSError:
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- resolved = p
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- parts = [part for part in resolved.as_posix().split("/") if part]
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+def _path_segments(path: Path) -> list[str]:
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+ parts = [part for part in path.as_posix().split("/") if part]
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if parts and parts[0].endswith(":"):
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# Windows path: "C:/Users/..." -> drop drive letter segment
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- parts = parts[1:]
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+ return parts[1:]
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return parts
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+def _normalize_path_segments(
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+ file_path: str | Path,
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+) -> tuple[list[str], list[str]]:
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+ """Return resolved and written segments so neither can hide a denied name."""
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+ written = Path(file_path).expanduser().absolute()
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+ try:
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+ resolved = written.resolve()
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+ except OSError:
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+ resolved = written
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+ return _path_segments(resolved), _path_segments(written)
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+
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+
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def _get_block_reason(
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file_path: t.Union[str, Path],
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additional_deny_segments: t.Optional[t.Sequence[str]] = None,
@@ -46,23 +53,25 @@ def _get_block_reason(
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deny: t.Set[str] = {s.lower() for s in BUILTIN_FILE_UPLOAD_PATH_DENY_SEGMENTS}
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deny.update(s.lower() for s in extra)
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- segments = _normalize_path_segments(file_path)
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- # Case-insensitive segment match: lower each path component once per check.
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- for seg, key in zip(segments, (s.lower() for s in segments), strict=True):
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- if key in deny:
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- return f'path segment "{seg}" is in the sensitive file upload denylist'
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-
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- if not segments:
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- return None
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- basename = segments[-1]
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- if _SECRET_LIKE_BASENAME.search(basename) or _DEFAULT_PRIVATE_KEY_BASENAME.match(
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- basename
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- ):
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- return (
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- f'file name "{basename}" looks like a credential, env, or private key file'
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- )
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- if basename.lower() == "credentials":
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- return 'file name "credentials" is often used for cloud/API credential stores'
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+ resolved_segments, written_segments = _normalize_path_segments(file_path)
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+ for segments in (resolved_segments, written_segments):
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+ # Case-insensitive segment match: lower each path component once per check.
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+ for seg, key in zip(segments, (s.lower() for s in segments), strict=True):
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+ if key in deny:
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+ return f'path segment "{seg}" is in the sensitive file upload denylist'
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+
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+ for segments in (resolved_segments, written_segments):
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+ if not segments:
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+ continue
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+ basename = segments[-1]
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+ if _SECRET_LIKE_BASENAME.search(
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+ basename
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+ ) or _DEFAULT_PRIVATE_KEY_BASENAME.match(basename):
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+ return f'file name "{basename}" looks like a credential, env, or private key file'
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+ if basename.lower() == "credentials":
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+ return (
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+ 'file name "credentials" is often used for cloud/API credential stores'
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+ )
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return None
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python/tests/test_sensitive_file_upload_paths.py
+43
@@ -73,6 +73,49 @@ def test_blocks_after_symlink_resolves_to_sensitive_dir() -> None:
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assert is_blocked_sensitive_file_upload_path(link) is True
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+def test_blocks_sensitive_symlinked_directory_with_plain_target(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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+ store = tmp_path / "state" / "claude"
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+ store.mkdir(parents=True)
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+ (store / "settings.json").write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8")
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+ home = tmp_path / "home"
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+ home.mkdir()
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+ link = home / ".claude"
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+ try:
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+ link.symlink_to(store, target_is_directory=True)
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+ except OSError:
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+ pytest.skip("symlinks not supported")
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+
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+ sensitive_path = link / "settings.json"
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+ assert is_blocked_sensitive_file_upload_path(sensitive_path) is True
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+ with pytest.raises(SensitiveFilePathBlockedError):
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+ assert_safe_local_file_upload_path(sensitive_path)
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+
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+
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+def test_blocks_sensitive_symlinked_basename_with_plain_target(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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+ target = tmp_path / "plain-config"
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+ target.write_text("SECRET=1", encoding="utf-8")
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+ link = tmp_path / ".env"
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+ try:
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+ link.symlink_to(target)
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+ except OSError:
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+ pytest.skip("symlinks not supported")
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+
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+ assert is_blocked_sensitive_file_upload_path(link) is True
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+
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+
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+def test_allows_ordinary_file_through_symlinked_directory(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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+ store = tmp_path / "store"
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+ store.mkdir()
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+ (store / "document.pdf").write_text("x", encoding="utf-8")
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+ link = tmp_path / "docs"
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+ try:
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+ link.symlink_to(store, target_is_directory=True)
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+ except OSError:
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+ pytest.skip("symlinks not supported")
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+
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+ assert is_blocked_sensitive_file_upload_path(link / "document.pdf") is False
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+
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+
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def test_assert_safe_raises() -> None:
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p = Path.home() / ".ssh" / "id_rsa"
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with pytest.raises(SensitiveFilePathBlockedError):