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fix(py): require `certifi>=2026.10.19` after eMudhra intermediate compromise (#5011)
## Summary Srujan asked to fix the `certifi` versions we ship after the eMudhra intermediate CA compromise (https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/). The Python SDK's lock resolved `certifi==2026.7.22`, and the `composio` package declared no floor, so customer installs can keep a bundle that trusts the compromised chain. The fix is `certifi>=2026.10.19`. Eight eMudhra intermediate keys were reported compromised on 2026-10-20. `certifi` 2026.10.19 removes the **emSign ECC Root CA - G3** root (SHA-256 `86:A1:EC:BA:…:BE:6B`) that they chain to. `requests` verifies TLS against certifi's bundle, and every SDK fetch goes through `requests`. Designated PR reviewer: [@jkomyno](mailto:alberto@composio.dev). ## Changes - Add `certifi>=2026.10.19` to `python/pyproject.toml` and `python/setup.py`, with a comment explaining why, the same way #4404 raised the `requests` and `urllib3` floors. - Relock `uv.lock`, `python/providers/openai/uv.lock` and `python/providers/claude_agent_sdk/uv.lock` with `uv lock --upgrade-package certifi` (uv 0.8.19, the version in `mise.toml`). In the provider locks, `uv` also refreshed their stale self-version (0.27.0 → 0.28.0) and the lockfile revision. - Separate commit: bump the locked `aiohttp` (lock only) from 3.14.3 to 3.14.5. The `Audit Python SDK` workflow started failing on CVE-2026-111063, CVE-2026-111064 and GHSA-2g87-pp6c-29x5 (fixed in 3.14.4). This is unrelated to certifi, but it blocks merging. - Use 2026.10.19 as the minimum, not 2026.10.18. 2026.10.18 removed four emSign roots and was replaced the next day by 2026.10.19, which removes only G3. ## Type of change - [x] Bug fix ## How Has This Been Tested? - `uv lock --check` passes for the root workspace and the provider locks. - **Provenance:** `certifi` 2026.10.19 has a PyPI Trusted Publishing attestation from `certifi/python-certifi`, `release.yml`, `release` environment. The locked hashes match it: wheel `sha256:42d35340…`, sdist `sha256:035c1e85…`. - **Bundle diff:** compared with 2026.7.22, `cacert.pem` only loses emSign ECC Root CA - G3 (121 → 120 roots). Nothing is added. - **Live check** against the reporter's test host `https://dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/`, which serves a leaf from the compromised `EM DV TLS CA - G3B` intermediate: - with the 2026.7.22 bundle, Python `ssl` trusts it - with the 2026.10.19 bundle, it fails with `CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED` - After `uv sync --frozen`, `requests.get(...)` to that host raises `SSLError: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED`, and `certifi.__version__ == "2026.10.19"`. - No unit tests were added. This is a dependency floor with no code change. - No changeset was added. Python SDK releases don't use changesets, and #4404 didn't add one. ## Checklist - [ ] I have read the Code of Conduct and this PR adheres to it - [ ] I have read and understand every line of this diff, including any LLM-generated code - [x] Any third-party docs links or promotional content follow the third-party links policy - [x] I ran linters/tests locally and they passed (lock checks + live TLS check above) - [x] I updated documentation as needed (n/a) - [x] I added tests or explain why not applicable - [x] I added a changeset if this change affects published packages (n/a for Python, see above) ## Additional context Customers only get the fix when they upgrade `composio` (or `certifi` directly). Ship a patch release soon after merge. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Srujan (in pst) [zen] <srujan@composio.dev> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: jkomyno <alberto@composio.dev>