revised^2: git-daemon extra paranoia, and path DWIM
This patch adds some extra paranoia to the git-daemon filename test. In particular, it now rejects pathnames containing //; it also adds a redundant test for pathname absoluteness (belts and suspenders.) A single / at the end of the path is still permitted, however, and the .git and /.git append DWIM stuff is now handled in an integrated manner, which means the resulting path will always be subjected to pathname checks. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
H. Peter Anvin committed
Oct 18, 2005 at 18:26 UTC
3e04c62daab0a8481f907c30414ed246f284a1d9
1 file changed
+57
-21
daemon.c
+57
-21
@@ -80,17 +80,30 @@ static int path_ok(const char *dir)
80
{
81
const char *p = dir;
82
char **pp;
83
- int sl = 1, ndot = 0;
83
+ int sl, ndot;
84
+
85
+ /* The pathname here should be an absolute path. */
86
+ if ( *p++ != '/' )
87
+ return 0;
88
+
89
+ sl = 1; ndot = 0;
90
91
for (;;) {
92
if ( *p == '.' ) {
93
ndot++;
88
- } else if ( *p == '/' || *p == '\0' ) {
94
+ } else if ( *p == '\0' ) {
95
+ /* Reject "." and ".." at the end of the path */
96
if ( sl && ndot > 0 && ndot < 3 )
90
- return 0; /* . or .. in path */
97
+ return 0;
98
+
99
+ /* Otherwise OK */
100
+ break;
101
+ } else if ( *p == '/' ) {
102
+ /* Refuse "", "." or ".." */
103
+ if ( sl && ndot < 3 )
104
+ return 0;
105
sl = 1;
92
- if ( *p == '\0' )
93
- break; /* End of string and all is good */
106
+ ndot = 0;
107
} else {
108
sl = ndot = 0;
109
}
@@ -99,7 +112,7 @@ static int path_ok(const char *dir)
112
113
if ( ok_paths && *ok_paths ) {
114
int ok = 0;
102
- int dirlen = strlen(dir); /* read_packet_line can return embedded \0 */
115
+ int dirlen = strlen(dir);
116
117
for ( pp = ok_paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
118
int len = strlen(*pp);
@@ -118,22 +131,16 @@ static int path_ok(const char *dir)
131
return 1; /* Path acceptable */
132
}
133
121
-static int upload(char *dir, int dirlen)
134
+static int set_dir(const char *dir)
135
{
123
- loginfo("Request for '%s'", dir);
124
-
136
if (!path_ok(dir)) {
126
- logerror("Forbidden directory: %s\n", dir);
137
+ errno = EACCES;
138
return -1;
139
}
140
130
- if (chdir(dir) < 0) {
131
- logerror("Cannot chdir('%s'): %s", dir, strerror(errno));
141
+ if ( chdir(dir) )
142
return -1;
133
- }
134
-
135
- chdir(".git");
136
-
143
+
144
/*
145
* Security on the cheap.
146
*
@@ -141,10 +148,39 @@ static int upload(char *dir, int dirlen)
148
* a "git-daemon-export-ok" flag that says that the other side
149
* is ok with us doing this.
150
*/
144
- if ((!export_all_trees && access("git-daemon-export-ok", F_OK)) ||
145
- access("objects/", X_OK) ||
146
- access("HEAD", R_OK)) {
147
- logerror("Not a valid git-daemon-enabled repository: '%s'", dir);
151
+ if (!export_all_trees && access("git-daemon-export-ok", F_OK)) {
152
+ errno = EACCES;
153
+ return -1;
154
+ }
155
+
156
+ if (access("objects/", X_OK) || access("HEAD", R_OK)) {
157
+ errno = EINVAL;
158
+ return -1;
159
+ }
160
+
161
+ /* If all this passed, we're OK */
162
+ return 0;
163
+}
164
+
165
+static int upload(char *dir)
166
+{
167
+ /* Try paths in this order */
168
+ static const char *paths[] = { "%s", "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s.git/.git", NULL };
169
+ const char **pp;
170
+ /* Enough for the longest path above including final null */
171
+ int buflen = strlen(dir)+10;
172
+ char *dirbuf = xmalloc(buflen);
173
+
174
+ loginfo("Request for '%s'", dir);
175
+
176
+ for ( pp = paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
177
+ snprintf(dirbuf, buflen, *pp, dir);
178
+ if ( !set_dir(dirbuf) )
179
+ break;
180
+ }
181
+
182
+ if ( !*pp ) {
183
+ logerror("Cannot set directory '%s': %s", dir, strerror(errno));
184
return -1;
185
}
186
@@ -170,7 +206,7 @@ static int execute(void)
206
line[--len] = 0;
207
208
if (!strncmp("git-upload-pack /", line, 17))
173
- return upload(line + 16, len - 16);
209
+ return upload(line+16);
210
211
logerror("Protocol error: '%s'", line);
212
return -1;