Git 2.39.4
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Johannes Schindelin committed
Apr 10, 2024 at 20:37 UTC
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Documentation/RelNotes/2.39.4.txt
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+Git v2.39.4 Release Notes
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+=========================
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+
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+This addresses the security issues CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2024-32004,
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+CVE-2024-32020 and CVE-2024-32021.
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+
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+This release also backports fixes necessary to let the CI builds pass
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+successfully.
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+
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+Fixes since v2.39.3
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+-------------------
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+
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+ * CVE-2024-32002:
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+
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+ Recursive clones on case-insensitive filesystems that support symbolic
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+ links are susceptible to case confusion that can be exploited to
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+ execute just-cloned code during the clone operation.
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+
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+ * CVE-2024-32004:
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+
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+ Repositories can be configured to execute arbitrary code during local
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+ clones. To address this, the ownership checks introduced in v2.30.3
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+ are now extended to cover cloning local repositories.
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+
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+ * CVE-2024-32020:
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+
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+ Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
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+ object database when source and target repository reside on the same
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+ disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
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+ those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
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+ untrusted user.
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+
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+ * CVE-2024-32021:
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+
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+ When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
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+ filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
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+ on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
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+ directory.
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+
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+ * CVE-2024-32465:
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+
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+ It is supposed to be safe to clone untrusted repositories, even those
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+ unpacked from zip archives or tarballs originating from untrusted
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+ sources, but Git can be tricked to run arbitrary code as part of the
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+ clone.
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+
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+ * Defense-in-depth: submodule: require the submodule path to contain
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+ directories only.
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+
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+ * Defense-in-depth: clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep
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+ the latter.
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+
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+ * Defense-in-depth: clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone.
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+
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+ * Defense-in-depth: core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning.
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+
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+ * Defense-in-depth: fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir.
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+
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+ * Various fix-ups on HTTP tests.
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+
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+ * Test update.
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+
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+ * HTTP Header redaction code has been adjusted for a newer version of
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+ cURL library that shows its traces differently from earlier
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+ versions.
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+
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+ * Fix was added to work around a regression in libcURL 8.7.0 (which has
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+ already been fixed in their tip of the tree).
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+
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+ * Replace macos-12 used at GitHub CI with macos-13.
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+
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+ * ci(linux-asan/linux-ubsan): let's save some time
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+
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+ * Tests with LSan from time to time seem to emit harmless message that makes
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+ our tests unnecessarily flakey; we work it around by filtering the
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+ uninteresting output.
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+
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+ * Update GitHub Actions jobs to avoid warnings against using deprecated
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+ version of Node.js.
GIT-VERSION-GEN
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#!/bin/sh
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GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE
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-DEF_VER=v2.39.3
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+DEF_VER=v2.39.4
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LF='
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'
RelNotes
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-Documentation/RelNotes/2.39.3.txt
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+Documentation/RelNotes/2.39.4.txt
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