t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
The most critical vulnerabilities in Git lead to a Remote Code Execution ("RCE"), i.e. the ability for an attacker to have malicious code being run as part of a Git operation that is not expected to run said code, such has hooks delivered as part of a `git clone`. A couple of parent commits ago, a bug was fixed that let Git be confused by the presence of a path `a-` to mistakenly assume that a directory `a/` can safely be created without removing an existing `a` that is a symbolic link. This bug did not represent an exploitable vulnerability on its own; Let's make sure it stays that way. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Johannes Schindelin committed
Mar 24, 2024 at 14:13 UTC
e4930e86c0d521aa6c3c3da9f590e852f6eeac21
1 file changed
+24
t/t5510-fetch.sh
+24
index c0b745e33b..211afe13e9 100755
--- a/t/t5510-fetch.sh
+++ b/t/t5510-fetch.sh
@@ -1240,6 +1240,30 @@ EOF
test_cmp fatal-expect fatal-actual
'
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone does not get confused by a D/F conflict' '
+ git init df-conflict &&
+ (
+ cd df-conflict &&
+ ln -s .git a &&
+ git add a &&
+ test_tick &&
+ git commit -m symlink &&
+ test_commit a- &&
+ rm a &&
+ mkdir -p a/hooks &&
+ write_script a/hooks/post-checkout <<-EOF &&
+ echo WHOOPSIE >&2
+ echo whoopsie >"$TRASH_DIRECTORY"/whoops
+ EOF
+ git add a/hooks/post-checkout &&
+ test_tick &&
+ git commit -m post-checkout
+ ) &&
+ git clone df-conflict clone 2>err &&
+ ! grep WHOOPS err &&
+ test_path_is_missing whoops
+'
+
. "$TEST_DIRECTORY"/lib-httpd.sh
start_httpd