revised^2: git-daemon extra paranoia, and path DWIM
This patch adds some extra paranoia to the git-daemon filename test. In particular, it now rejects pathnames containing //; it also adds a redundant test for pathname absoluteness (belts and suspenders.) A single / at the end of the path is still permitted, however, and the .git and /.git append DWIM stuff is now handled in an integrated manner, which means the resulting path will always be subjected to pathname checks. [jc: backported to 0.99.8 maintenance branch] Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
H. Peter Anvin committed
Oct 19, 2005 at 00:01 UTC
e51fd86ab320a2b8457653ba06d9f4ce9e92b4b1
1 file changed
+57
-21
daemon.c
+57
-21
@@ -79,17 +79,30 @@ static int path_ok(const char *dir)
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{
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const char *p = dir;
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char **pp;
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- int sl = 1, ndot = 0;
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+ int sl, ndot;
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+
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+ /* The pathname here should be an absolute path. */
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+ if ( *p++ != '/' )
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ sl = 1; ndot = 0;
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for (;;) {
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if ( *p == '.' ) {
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ndot++;
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- } else if ( *p == '/' || *p == '\0' ) {
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+ } else if ( *p == '\0' ) {
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+ /* Reject "." and ".." at the end of the path */
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if ( sl && ndot > 0 && ndot < 3 )
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- return 0; /* . or .. in path */
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ /* Otherwise OK */
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+ break;
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+ } else if ( *p == '/' ) {
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+ /* Refuse "", "." or ".." */
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+ if ( sl && ndot < 3 )
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+ return 0;
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sl = 1;
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- if ( *p == '\0' )
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- break; /* End of string and all is good */
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+ ndot = 0;
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} else {
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sl = ndot = 0;
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}
@@ -98,7 +111,7 @@ static int path_ok(const char *dir)
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if ( ok_paths && *ok_paths ) {
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int ok = 0;
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- int dirlen = strlen(dir); /* read_packet_line can return embedded \0 */
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+ int dirlen = strlen(dir);
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for ( pp = ok_paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
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int len = strlen(*pp);
@@ -117,22 +130,16 @@ static int path_ok(const char *dir)
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return 1; /* Path acceptable */
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}
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-static int upload(char *dir, int dirlen)
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+static int set_dir(const char *dir)
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{
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- loginfo("Request for '%s'", dir);
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-
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if (!path_ok(dir)) {
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- logerror("Forbidden directory: %s\n", dir);
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+ errno = EACCES;
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return -1;
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}
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- if (chdir(dir) < 0) {
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- logerror("Cannot chdir('%s'): %s", dir, strerror(errno));
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+ if ( chdir(dir) )
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return -1;
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- }
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-
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- chdir(".git");
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-
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+
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/*
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* Security on the cheap.
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*
@@ -140,10 +147,39 @@ static int upload(char *dir, int dirlen)
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* a "git-daemon-export-ok" flag that says that the other side
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* is ok with us doing this.
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*/
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- if ((!export_all_trees && access("git-daemon-export-ok", F_OK)) ||
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- access("objects/00", X_OK) ||
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- access("HEAD", R_OK)) {
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- logerror("Not a valid git-daemon-enabled repository: '%s'", dir);
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+ if (!export_all_trees && access("git-daemon-export-ok", F_OK)) {
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+ errno = EACCES;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (access("objects/", X_OK) || access("HEAD", R_OK)) {
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+ errno = EINVAL;
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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+ /* If all this passed, we're OK */
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+static int upload(char *dir)
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+{
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+ /* Try paths in this order */
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+ static const char *paths[] = { "%s", "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s.git/.git", NULL };
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+ const char **pp;
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+ /* Enough for the longest path above including final null */
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+ int buflen = strlen(dir)+10;
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+ char *dirbuf = xmalloc(buflen);
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+
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+ loginfo("Request for '%s'", dir);
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+
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+ for ( pp = paths ; *pp ; pp++ ) {
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+ snprintf(dirbuf, buflen, *pp, dir);
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+ if ( !set_dir(dirbuf) )
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+ break;
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+ }
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+
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+ if ( !*pp ) {
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+ logerror("Cannot set directory '%s': %s", dir, strerror(errno));
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return -1;
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}
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@@ -169,7 +205,7 @@ static int execute(void)
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line[--len] = 0;
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if (!strncmp("git-upload-pack /", line, 17))
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- return upload(line + 16, len - 16);
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+ return upload(line+16);
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logerror("Protocol error: '%s'", line);
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return -1;