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| 1 | /** |
| 2 | * Blocks accidental upload of local files from well-known secret/credential locations |
| 3 | * during auto file upload (and {@link getFileDataAfterUploadingToS3}). |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * This is the single canonical guard shared by the core SDK and downstream |
| 6 | * packages (e.g. `@composio/cli`). Filesystem access goes through the `#platform` |
| 7 | * abstraction so this module stays free of static `node:*` imports and is safe to |
| 8 | * re-export from the package root (edge/workerd builds included). |
| 9 | */ |
| 10 | import { platform } from '#platform'; |
| 11 | import { ComposioSensitiveFilePathBlockedError } from '../errors/FileModifierErrors'; |
| 12 | |
| 13 | /** |
| 14 | * Path segments (a single path component) that indicate a sensitive directory when |
| 15 | * they appear anywhere in a resolved local path. Matching follows the case sensitivity |
| 16 | * of the filesystem containing that path. |
| 17 | */ |
| 18 | export const BUILTIN_FILE_UPLOAD_PATH_DENY_SEGMENTS: readonly string[] = [ |
| 19 | '.ssh', |
| 20 | '.aws', |
| 21 | '.azure', |
| 22 | '.gnupg', |
| 23 | '.kube', |
| 24 | '.docker', |
| 25 | '.claude', // may contain API keys and project context read by assistants |
| 26 | '.password-store', |
| 27 | 'keychains', // e.g. ~/Library/Keychains |
| 28 | ]; |
| 29 | |
| 30 | const SECRET_LIKE_BASENAME = /^(\.env(\.|$)|\.netrc$|\.pgpass$)/i; |
| 31 | /** Default SSH private key basenames (public keys like id_rsa.pub are allowed). */ |
| 32 | const DEFAULT_PRIVATE_KEY_BASENAME = /^id_(rsa|ed25519|ecdsa|dsa|ecdsa_sk)(\.old)?$/i; |
| 33 | |
| 34 | const splitSegments = (aPath: string): string[] => aPath.split(/[/\\]+/).filter(Boolean); |
| 35 | |
| 36 | /** |
| 37 | * Returns normalized path segments, resolving symlinks when the path exists. |
| 38 | * |
| 39 | * Both the written path and the symlink-resolved one are returned, because a |
| 40 | * denied segment can be hidden by a symlink in either direction: |
| 41 | * |
| 42 | * - `~/innocent-name` -> `~/nested/.aws/creds` hides `.aws` from the written |
| 43 | * path, so the denylist has to see the resolved one. |
| 44 | * - `~/.claude` -> `/state/claude` hides `.claude` from the *resolved* path, |
| 45 | * so the denylist also has to see the written one. Dotfile managers |
| 46 | * (chezmoi, stow, yadm) and containerised home directories produce exactly |
| 47 | * this layout. |
| 48 | * |
| 49 | * Matching only the resolved path silently turns the denylist off for the |
| 50 | * second case. |
| 51 | */ |
| 52 | function normalizePath(filePath: string): { |
| 53 | resolvedPath: string; |
| 54 | segments: string[]; |
| 55 | writtenSegments: string[]; |
| 56 | } { |
| 57 | const absolute = platform.resolvePath(filePath); |
| 58 | let resolved = absolute; |
| 59 | try { |
| 60 | if (platform.existsSync(absolute)) { |
| 61 | resolved = platform.realpathSync(absolute); |
| 62 | } |
| 63 | } catch { |
| 64 | // If realpath fails (e.g. race), use resolved path |
| 65 | } |
| 66 | return { |
| 67 | resolvedPath: resolved, |
| 68 | segments: splitSegments(resolved), |
| 69 | writtenSegments: splitSegments(absolute), |
| 70 | }; |
| 71 | } |
| 72 | |
| 73 | /** |
| 74 | * True if the path is under a built-in or extra deny segment, or the basename |
| 75 | * looks like an env / netrc / default SSH private key name. |
| 76 | */ |
| 77 | export function isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath( |
| 78 | filePath: string, |
| 79 | additionalDenySegments?: string[] |
| 80 | ): boolean { |
| 81 | return getSensitiveFileUploadPathBlockReason(filePath, additionalDenySegments) != null; |
| 82 | } |
| 83 | |
| 84 | function getSensitiveFileUploadPathBlockReason( |
| 85 | filePath: string, |
| 86 | additionalDenySegments?: string[] |
| 87 | ): string | null { |
| 88 | const { resolvedPath, segments, writtenSegments } = normalizePath(filePath); |
| 89 | const isCaseSensitive = platform.isFileSystemCaseSensitive?.(resolvedPath) ?? true; |
| 90 | const normalizeSegment = (segment: string) => (isCaseSensitive ? segment : segment.toLowerCase()); |
| 91 | const deny = new Set( |
| 92 | [ |
| 93 | ...BUILTIN_FILE_UPLOAD_PATH_DENY_SEGMENTS, |
| 94 | ...(additionalDenySegments ?? []).map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean), |
| 95 | ].map(normalizeSegment) |
| 96 | ); |
| 97 | |
| 98 | for (const candidate of [segments, writtenSegments]) { |
| 99 | const segmentsForMatch = isCaseSensitive ? candidate : candidate.map(normalizeSegment); |
| 100 | for (let i = 0; i < candidate.length; i++) { |
| 101 | if (deny.has(segmentsForMatch[i]!)) { |
| 102 | return `path segment "${candidate[i]}" is in the sensitive file upload denylist`; |
| 103 | } |
| 104 | } |
| 105 | } |
| 106 | |
| 107 | // Same two directions as the segment scan: `~/.env -> /state/config` hides a |
| 108 | // denied basename from the resolved path, and a symlink pointing *at* a |
| 109 | // credential file hides it from the written one. |
| 110 | const basenames = [segments.at(-1), writtenSegments.at(-1)].filter( |
| 111 | (name): name is string => !!name |
| 112 | ); |
| 113 | for (const basename of basenames) { |
| 114 | if (SECRET_LIKE_BASENAME.test(basename) || DEFAULT_PRIVATE_KEY_BASENAME.test(basename)) { |
| 115 | return `file name "${basename}" looks like a credential, env, or private key file`; |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | if (basename.toLowerCase() === 'credentials') { |
| 118 | return 'file name "credentials" is often used for cloud/API credential stores'; |
| 119 | } |
| 120 | } |
| 121 | return null; |
| 122 | } |
| 123 | |
| 124 | /** |
| 125 | * Default remediation hint appended to the block message. Assumes an SDK caller |
| 126 | * that exposes `sensitiveFileUploadProtection`. Callers without such an opt-out |
| 127 | * (e.g. `@composio/cli`) should pass their own `remediation` so the message does |
| 128 | * not advertise an option the caller cannot honor. |
| 129 | */ |
| 130 | const DEFAULT_REMEDIATION = |
| 131 | `To upload from this path anyway, set sensitiveFileUploadProtection: false on Composio ` + |
| 132 | `(not recommended) or use a copy outside sensitive locations.`; |
| 133 | |
| 134 | /** |
| 135 | * @throws {ComposioSensitiveFilePathBlockedError} if the path is not allowed |
| 136 | */ |
| 137 | export function assertSafeFileUploadPath( |
| 138 | filePath: string, |
| 139 | options?: { additionalDenySegments?: string[]; remediation?: string } |
| 140 | ): void { |
| 141 | const reason = getSensitiveFileUploadPathBlockReason(filePath, options?.additionalDenySegments); |
| 142 | if (reason) { |
| 143 | const remediation = options?.remediation ?? DEFAULT_REMEDIATION; |
| 144 | throw new ComposioSensitiveFilePathBlockedError( |
| 145 | `Refusing to upload: ${reason}. ${remediation}`, |
| 146 | { |
| 147 | meta: { filePath, reason }, |
| 148 | } |
| 149 | ); |
| 150 | } |
| 151 | } |