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1 import { afterEach, describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';
2 import * as path from 'node:path';
3 import * as os from 'node:os';
4 import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, symlinkSync, rmSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
5 import {
6 assertSafeFileUploadPath,
7 isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath,
8 } from '../../src/utils/sensitiveFileUploadPaths';
9 import { platform } from '../../src/platform/node';
10 import * as publicApi from '../../src';
11
12 describe('sensitiveFileUploadPaths', () => {
13 afterEach(() => {
14 vi.restoreAllMocks();
15 });
16
17 it('allows normal project files', () => {
18 const p = path.join('/tmp', 'composio-test', 'document.pdf');
19 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(p)).toBe(false);
20 expect(() => assertSafeFileUploadPath(p)).not.toThrow();
21 });
22
23 it('blocks common credential directory segments', () => {
24 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join(os.homedir(), '.aws', 'credentials'))).toBe(
25 true
26 );
27 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join(os.homedir(), '.ssh', 'id_ed25519'))).toBe(
28 true
29 );
30 expect(
31 isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join(os.homedir(), '.claude', 'settings.json'))
32 ).toBe(true);
33 });
34
35 it('blocks .env-style basenames', () => {
36 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join('/app', 'repo', '.env'))).toBe(true);
37 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join('/app', 'repo', '.env.local'))).toBe(true);
38 });
39
40 it('blocks default private key basenames (defense in depth)', () => {
41 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join('/tmp', 'id_ed25519'))).toBe(true);
42 });
43
44 it('does not block public key files by basename', () => {
45 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join('/tmp', 'id_ed25519.pub'))).toBe(false);
46 });
47
48 it('honors additional deny segments from config', () => {
49 expect(
50 isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join('/data', 'secrets', 'x.txt'), ['secrets'])
51 ).toBe(true);
52 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join('/data', 'ok', 'x.txt'), ['secrets'])).toBe(
53 false
54 );
55 });
56
57 it('matches deny segments without case on a case-insensitive filesystem', () => {
58 vi.spyOn(platform, 'isFileSystemCaseSensitive').mockReturnValue(false);
59
60 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath('/Users/me/.Kube/config')).toBe(true);
61 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath('/data/Secrets/x.txt', ['secrets'])).toBe(true);
62 });
63
64 it('preserves distinct segment casing on a case-sensitive filesystem', () => {
65 vi.spyOn(platform, 'isFileSystemCaseSensitive').mockReturnValue(true);
66
67 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath('/home/me/.kube/config')).toBe(true);
68 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath('/home/me/.Kube/config')).toBe(false);
69 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath('/data/secrets/x.txt', ['secrets'])).toBe(true);
70 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath('/data/Secrets/x.txt', ['secrets'])).toBe(false);
71 });
72
73 it('is re-exported from the package root for downstream consumers (e.g. @composio/cli)', () => {
74 // The CLI imports the guard from `@composio/core` to share this one denylist
75 // (issue #3746). Lock the public surface so a refactor cannot silently drop it.
76 expect(typeof publicApi.assertSafeFileUploadPath).toBe('function');
77 expect(typeof publicApi.isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath).toBe('function');
78 expect(Array.isArray(publicApi.BUILTIN_FILE_UPLOAD_PATH_DENY_SEGMENTS)).toBe(true);
79 expect(publicApi.BUILTIN_FILE_UPLOAD_PATH_DENY_SEGMENTS).toContain('.ssh');
80 });
81
82 it('blocks after realpath resolves a symlink into a sensitive directory', () => {
83 const root = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'composio-symlink-'));
84 try {
85 const awsDir = path.join(root, 'nested', '.aws');
86 mkdirSync(awsDir, { recursive: true });
87 const target = path.join(awsDir, 'creds');
88 writeFileSync(target, 'x');
89 const link = path.join(root, 'innocent-name');
90 symlinkSync(target, link);
91 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(link)).toBe(true);
92 } finally {
93 rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
94 }
95 });
96
97 // The inverse of the case above: realpath moves the denied segment *out* of
98 // the path instead of into it. Dotfile managers (chezmoi, stow, yadm) and
99 // containerised home directories lay `~/.claude -> /state/claude` out exactly
100 // this way, so matching only the resolved path turned the denylist off for
101 // them.
102 it('blocks a sensitive directory that is itself a symlink to a plain path', () => {
103 const root = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'composio-symlink-dir-'));
104 try {
105 const store = path.join(root, 'state', 'claude');
106 mkdirSync(store, { recursive: true });
107 writeFileSync(path.join(store, 'settings.json'), '{}');
108 const home = path.join(root, 'home');
109 mkdirSync(home, { recursive: true });
110 const link = path.join(home, '.claude');
111 symlinkSync(store, link);
112
113 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join(link, 'settings.json'))).toBe(true);
114 expect(() => assertSafeFileUploadPath(path.join(link, 'settings.json'))).toThrow();
115 } finally {
116 rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
117 }
118 });
119
120 // Same hiding trick applied to the basename rather than a directory segment:
121 // the written name is `.env`, the resolved one is not.
122 it('blocks a denied basename whose symlink target is named innocuously', () => {
123 const root = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'composio-symlink-base-'));
124 try {
125 const store = path.join(root, 'store');
126 mkdirSync(store, { recursive: true });
127 const target = path.join(store, 'plain-config');
128 writeFileSync(target, 'SECRET=1');
129 const project = path.join(root, 'project');
130 mkdirSync(project, { recursive: true });
131 const link = path.join(project, '.env');
132 symlinkSync(target, link);
133
134 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(link)).toBe(true);
135 } finally {
136 rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
137 }
138 });
139
140 it('still allows an ordinary file reached through a symlinked directory', () => {
141 const root = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'composio-symlink-ok-'));
142 try {
143 const store = path.join(root, 'store');
144 mkdirSync(store, { recursive: true });
145 writeFileSync(path.join(store, 'document.pdf'), 'x');
146 const link = path.join(root, 'docs');
147 symlinkSync(store, link);
148
149 expect(isBlockedSensitiveFileUploadPath(path.join(link, 'document.pdf'))).toBe(false);
150 } finally {
151 rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
152 }
153 });
154 });