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| 1 | """Guardrail against building filesystem paths out of untrusted input. |
| 2 | |
| 3 | The failure mode this prevents: a path built from unvalidated API response |
| 4 | fields, with a containment check that compares the result against the very |
| 5 | directory those fields helped build — tainted against tainted, so it always |
| 6 | passes. |
| 7 | |
| 8 | A convention in `AGENTS.md` would not catch that. Such a line gets written by |
| 9 | someone who has already thought about traversal and added a check. So this |
| 10 | enforces the rule mechanically: every path built from something that is |
| 11 | not a literal or a module-level constant must be recorded in `REVIEWED_JOINS` |
| 12 | with a reason, and each entry must still be backed by the validation its reason |
| 13 | cites. |
| 14 | |
| 15 | Three properties matter, and each is a test below, because each is easy to get |
| 16 | wrong in a way that leaves the check looking present but doing nothing: |
| 17 | |
| 18 | 1. **Cover every spelling.** A detector that only understands the `/` operator |
| 19 | is green while `os.path.join` reintroduces the bug. |
| 20 | 2. **Fail closed.** No guessing from variable names — renaming `outdir` to |
| 21 | `base` must not silently disable the check. |
| 22 | 3. **Bind the allowlist to its evidence.** An entry keyed only on source text |
| 23 | keeps passing after the validation around it is deleted. |
| 24 | |
| 25 | To satisfy this test, prefer `composio.utils.safe_path.secure_join`, which |
| 26 | validates each untrusted component and anchors containment on a trusted root. |
| 27 | """ |
| 28 | |
| 29 | import ast |
| 30 | import functools |
| 31 | import typing as t |
| 32 | from pathlib import Path |
| 33 | |
| 34 | import pytest |
| 35 | |
| 36 | PYTHON_ROOT = Path(__file__).parent.parent |
| 37 | SCANNED_ROOTS = (PYTHON_ROOT / "composio", PYTHON_ROOT / "providers") |
| 38 | |
| 39 | _PATH_CALLS = frozenset({"Path", "PurePath", "PurePosixPath", "PureWindowsPath"}) |
| 40 | """Constructors whose result is a path.""" |
| 41 | |
| 42 | _DIRECT_PATH_SINKS = frozenset({"open", "makedirs", "mkdir"}) |
| 43 | """Functions whose first argument becomes a filesystem path.""" |
| 44 | |
| 45 | |
| 46 | def _reviewed_path( |
| 47 | reason: str, |
| 48 | *requires: str, |
| 49 | occurrences: int = 1, |
| 50 | ) -> t.Dict[str, t.Any]: |
| 51 | return { |
| 52 | "reason": reason, |
| 53 | "requires": frozenset(requires), |
| 54 | "occurrences": occurrences, |
| 55 | } |
| 56 | |
| 57 | |
| 58 | REVIEWED_JOINS: t.Dict[t.Tuple[str, str], t.Dict[str, t.Any]] = { |
| 59 | ( |
| 60 | "composio/core/models/_files.py", |
| 61 | "Path(configured)", |
| 62 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 63 | "`configured` is read from the COMPOSIO_CACHE_DIR environment variable, " |
| 64 | "which is local configuration, not an API response." |
| 65 | ), |
| 66 | ( |
| 67 | "composio/core/models/_files.py", |
| 68 | "Path(path_in)", |
| 69 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 70 | "`FileUploadable.from_path` converts the caller's local upload path after " |
| 71 | "the upload allowlist and sensitive-path checks have run.", |
| 72 | "assert_path_inside_upload_dirs", |
| 73 | "assert_safe_local_file_upload_path", |
| 74 | ), |
| 75 | ( |
| 76 | "composio/core/models/_files.py", |
| 77 | "Path(outdir)", |
| 78 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 79 | "`FileHelper` accepts this download root from local SDK configuration; API " |
| 80 | "response values are joined beneath it through the safe-path helpers." |
| 81 | ), |
| 82 | ( |
| 83 | "composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.py", |
| 84 | "PureWindowsPath(self.mount_relative_path)", |
| 85 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 86 | "This property only extracts a display basename. `RemoteFile.save` validates " |
| 87 | "the same server value before using it as a filesystem path." |
| 88 | ), |
| 89 | ( |
| 90 | "composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.py", |
| 91 | "Path(path)", |
| 92 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 93 | "A non-default `RemoteFile.save` destination is selected explicitly by the " |
| 94 | "caller and does not contain an API-derived path component." |
| 95 | ), |
| 96 | ( |
| 97 | "composio/core/models/tool_router_session_files.py", |
| 98 | "Path(path_str)", |
| 99 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 100 | "The upload input is a caller-selected local file and is checked before it is " |
| 101 | "read; it is not a path constructed from a remote response.", |
| 102 | "exists", |
| 103 | "is_file", |
| 104 | ), |
| 105 | ( |
| 106 | "composio/integration_test/conftest.py", |
| 107 | "Path(__file__)", |
| 108 | ): _reviewed_path("`__file__` is the trusted location of this installed module."), |
| 109 | ( |
| 110 | "composio/utils/mimetypes.py", |
| 111 | "Path(file)", |
| 112 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 113 | "`mimetypes.guess` uses `Path` for suffix parsing only and never accesses the " |
| 114 | "filesystem." |
| 115 | ), |
| 116 | ( |
| 117 | "composio/utils/safe_path.py", |
| 118 | "PureWindowsPath(value)", |
| 119 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 120 | "The path parser detects cross-platform separators before the component is " |
| 121 | "accepted by the strict slug pattern.", |
| 122 | "fullmatch", |
| 123 | ), |
| 124 | ( |
| 125 | "composio/utils/safe_path.py", |
| 126 | "PureWindowsPath(name)", |
| 127 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 128 | "`safe_basename` collapses the value, rejects NUL bytes and invalid " |
| 129 | "Unicode, rewrites Windows-invalid forms and reserved device names, fits " |
| 130 | "the encoded length, and tags a rewritten name with a digest of the " |
| 131 | "original to distinguish ordinary normalization collisions. Download " |
| 132 | "writes create files exclusively to preserve existing destinations.", |
| 133 | "_encoded_length", |
| 134 | "_fit_filename_bytes", |
| 135 | "_tag_with_original", |
| 136 | ), |
| 137 | ( |
| 138 | "composio/utils/safe_path.py", |
| 139 | "Path(root)", |
| 140 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 141 | "`resolve_root` normalizes a caller-supplied trusted anchor before any " |
| 142 | "containment comparison.", |
| 143 | "expanduser", |
| 144 | "resolve", |
| 145 | ), |
| 146 | ( |
| 147 | "composio/utils/safe_path.py", |
| 148 | "resolved_base / safe_basename(name, label=label)", |
| 149 | ): { |
| 150 | "reason": ( |
| 151 | "`secure_basename_join`, the sanctioned single-filename join. The " |
| 152 | "name is collapsed and validated by `safe_basename`, and the result " |
| 153 | "is re-checked with `is_inside_dir` against a `resolve_root`-derived " |
| 154 | "anchor that the caller supplies separately from the join base — the " |
| 155 | "distinction this whole module turns on." |
| 156 | ), |
| 157 | "requires": frozenset({"resolve_root", "safe_basename", "is_inside_dir"}), |
| 158 | "occurrences": 1, |
| 159 | }, |
| 160 | ("composio/utils/safe_path.py", "resolved_root.joinpath(*safe_components)"): { |
| 161 | "reason": ( |
| 162 | "`secure_join`, the sanctioned multi-component join. Every component " |
| 163 | "has passed `assert_safe_path_component`, the root came from " |
| 164 | "`resolve_root`, and the joined result is re-checked with " |
| 165 | "`is_inside_dir` before return." |
| 166 | ), |
| 167 | "requires": frozenset( |
| 168 | {"resolve_root", "assert_safe_path_component", "is_inside_dir"} |
| 169 | ), |
| 170 | "occurrences": 1, |
| 171 | }, |
| 172 | ( |
| 173 | "composio/utils/sensitive_file_upload_paths.py", |
| 174 | "Path(file_path)", |
| 175 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 176 | "This converts a caller-selected upload path so the sensitive-path denylist " |
| 177 | "can inspect its normalized components.", |
| 178 | "expanduser", |
| 179 | "resolve", |
| 180 | ), |
| 181 | ( |
| 182 | "composio/utils/upload_dir_allowlist.py", |
| 183 | "Path(s)", |
| 184 | ): _reviewed_path( |
| 185 | "This converts a locally configured upload-allowlist entry and resolves it " |
| 186 | "before comparisons.", |
| 187 | "expanduser", |
| 188 | "resolve", |
| 189 | ), |
| 190 | } |
| 191 | """Reviewed dynamic path construction in the shipped Python packages. |
| 192 | |
| 193 | Entries outside `safe_path` are limited to caller-selected local paths, local |
| 194 | configuration, module locations, or lexical parsing. API-derived components |
| 195 | must use `secure_join` or `secure_basename_join`. |
| 196 | """ |
| 197 | |
| 198 | for _provider_setup in ( |
| 199 | "anthropic", |
| 200 | "autogen", |
| 201 | "claude_agent_sdk", |
| 202 | "crewai", |
| 203 | "gemini", |
| 204 | "google", |
| 205 | "google_adk", |
| 206 | "langchain", |
| 207 | "langgraph", |
| 208 | "llamaindex", |
| 209 | "openai", |
| 210 | "openai_agents", |
| 211 | "typesafe", |
| 212 | ): |
| 213 | REVIEWED_JOINS[(f"providers/{_provider_setup}/setup.py", "Path(__file__)")] = ( |
| 214 | _reviewed_path("`__file__` is the trusted location of this provider package.") |
| 215 | ) |
| 216 | del _provider_setup |
| 217 | |
| 218 | |
| 219 | def _module_constants(tree: ast.Module) -> t.Set[str]: |
| 220 | """Module-level ALL_CAPS names bound to a literal. |
| 221 | |
| 222 | Both halves matter. Without the module-level requirement a function-local |
| 223 | `SLUG = tool.slug` is exempt; without the literal requirement a module-level |
| 224 | `SLUG = os.environ[...]` is exempt. Either one is a one-token bypass. |
| 225 | """ |
| 226 | out: t.Set[str] = set() |
| 227 | for node in tree.body: |
| 228 | targets: t.List[ast.expr] |
| 229 | if isinstance(node, ast.Assign): |
| 230 | targets = list(node.targets) |
| 231 | value = node.value |
| 232 | elif isinstance(node, ast.AnnAssign) and node.value is not None: |
| 233 | targets = [node.target] |
| 234 | value = node.value |
| 235 | else: |
| 236 | continue |
| 237 | if not _is_literal_expr(value): |
| 238 | continue |
| 239 | for tgt in targets: |
| 240 | if isinstance(tgt, ast.Name) and tgt.id.isupper(): |
| 241 | out.add(tgt.id) |
| 242 | return out |
| 243 | |
| 244 | |
| 245 | def _is_literal_expr(node: ast.expr) -> bool: |
| 246 | """True for expressions built only from literals.""" |
| 247 | try: |
| 248 | ast.literal_eval(node) |
| 249 | return True |
| 250 | except (ValueError, TypeError, SyntaxError, MemoryError, RecursionError): |
| 251 | return False |
| 252 | |
| 253 | |
| 254 | def _is_trusted(node: ast.expr, consts: t.Set[str]) -> bool: |
| 255 | if isinstance(node, ast.Constant): |
| 256 | return True |
| 257 | if isinstance(node, ast.Name) and node.id in consts: |
| 258 | return True |
| 259 | return False |
| 260 | |
| 261 | |
| 262 | def _call_name(func: ast.expr) -> str: |
| 263 | if isinstance(func, ast.Attribute): |
| 264 | return func.attr |
| 265 | if isinstance(func, ast.Name): |
| 266 | return func.id |
| 267 | return "" |
| 268 | |
| 269 | |
| 270 | def _is_os_path_join(func: ast.expr) -> bool: |
| 271 | """`os.path.join(...)` / `posixpath.join(...)`, not `",".join(...)`.""" |
| 272 | if not (isinstance(func, ast.Attribute) and func.attr == "join"): |
| 273 | return False |
| 274 | recv = func.value |
| 275 | if isinstance(recv, ast.Attribute): |
| 276 | return recv.attr == "path" |
| 277 | if isinstance(recv, ast.Name): |
| 278 | return recv.id in {"posixpath", "ntpath", "path"} |
| 279 | return False |
| 280 | |
| 281 | |
| 282 | def _is_direct_path_sink(func: ast.expr) -> bool: |
| 283 | """Builtins or ``os`` functions whose first argument is the path. |
| 284 | |
| 285 | Method calls such as ``Path.open(mode)`` and ``Path.write_bytes(data)`` |
| 286 | carry the path in their receiver, not in the positional arguments. Their |
| 287 | receiver construction is reviewed separately by the ``_PATH_CALLS`` rule. |
| 288 | """ |
| 289 | if isinstance(func, ast.Name): |
| 290 | return func.id in _DIRECT_PATH_SINKS |
| 291 | return ( |
| 292 | isinstance(func, ast.Attribute) |
| 293 | and func.attr in _DIRECT_PATH_SINKS |
| 294 | and isinstance(func.value, ast.Name) |
| 295 | and func.value.id == "os" |
| 296 | ) |
| 297 | |
| 298 | |
| 299 | @functools.lru_cache(maxsize=None) |
| 300 | def _read_and_parse(path: Path, mtime_ns: int) -> t.Tuple[str, ast.Module]: |
| 301 | source = path.read_text() |
| 302 | return source, ast.parse(source) |
| 303 | |
| 304 | |
| 305 | def _parse_cached(path: Path) -> t.Tuple[str, ast.Module]: |
| 306 | """Parse ``path``, reusing the previous result while its mtime is unchanged. |
| 307 | |
| 308 | Keyed on mtime so the detector's own self-tests, which rewrite the same |
| 309 | synthetic file with different content, still see the new source. |
| 310 | """ |
| 311 | return _read_and_parse(path, path.stat().st_mtime_ns) |
| 312 | |
| 313 | |
| 314 | class Join(t.NamedTuple): |
| 315 | module: str |
| 316 | lineno: int |
| 317 | text: str |
| 318 | kind: str |
| 319 | |
| 320 | |
| 321 | def _collect_joins(roots: t.Sequence[Path] = SCANNED_ROOTS) -> t.List[Join]: |
| 322 | """Every path construction from a non-literal, non-module-constant value.""" |
| 323 | found: t.List[Join] = [] |
| 324 | for root in roots: |
| 325 | if not root.exists(): |
| 326 | continue |
| 327 | for py in sorted(root.rglob("*.py")): |
| 328 | try: |
| 329 | source, tree = _parse_cached(py) |
| 330 | except SyntaxError: # pragma: no cover - lint job fails first |
| 331 | continue |
| 332 | consts = _module_constants(tree) |
| 333 | try: |
| 334 | module = str(py.relative_to(PYTHON_ROOT)) |
| 335 | except ValueError: |
| 336 | # Synthetic roots used by the detector's own self-tests. |
| 337 | module = str(py.relative_to(root.parent)) |
| 338 | |
| 339 | def record(node: t.Union[ast.expr, ast.stmt], kind: str) -> None: |
| 340 | text = ast.get_source_segment(source, node) or "" |
| 341 | found.append(Join(module, node.lineno, " ".join(text.split()), kind)) |
| 342 | |
| 343 | for node in ast.walk(tree): |
| 344 | if isinstance(node, ast.BinOp) and isinstance(node.op, ast.Div): |
| 345 | if not _is_trusted(node.right, consts): |
| 346 | record(node, "div") |
| 347 | elif isinstance(node, ast.AugAssign) and isinstance(node.op, ast.Div): |
| 348 | if not _is_trusted(node.value, consts): |
| 349 | record(node, "augdiv") |
| 350 | elif isinstance(node, ast.Call): |
| 351 | name = _call_name(node.func) |
| 352 | args = node.args |
| 353 | if name == "joinpath": |
| 354 | if any(not _is_trusted(a, consts) for a in args): |
| 355 | record(node, "joinpath") |
| 356 | elif _is_os_path_join(node.func): |
| 357 | if any(not _is_trusted(a, consts) for a in args): |
| 358 | record(node, "os.path.join") |
| 359 | elif name in _PATH_CALLS: |
| 360 | if any(not _is_trusted(a, consts) for a in args): |
| 361 | record(node, "Path(...)") |
| 362 | elif _is_direct_path_sink(node.func): |
| 363 | if args and not _is_trusted(args[0], consts): |
| 364 | record(node, name) |
| 365 | return found |
| 366 | |
| 367 | |
| 368 | def _enclosing_function_calls(module: str, lineno: int) -> t.Set[str]: |
| 369 | """Names called inside the function containing ``lineno``.""" |
| 370 | path = PYTHON_ROOT / module |
| 371 | _, tree = _parse_cached(path) |
| 372 | best: t.Optional[t.Union[ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef]] = None |
| 373 | for node in ast.walk(tree): |
| 374 | if isinstance(node, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)): |
| 375 | end = getattr(node, "end_lineno", None) or lineno |
| 376 | if node.lineno <= lineno <= end: |
| 377 | if best is None or node.lineno > best.lineno: # innermost |
| 378 | best = node |
| 379 | if best is None: |
| 380 | return set() |
| 381 | return {_call_name(n.func) for n in ast.walk(best) if isinstance(n, ast.Call)} |
| 382 | |
| 383 | |
| 384 | def test_every_untrusted_path_join_is_reviewed(): |
| 385 | unreviewed = [ |
| 386 | j for j in _collect_joins() if (j.module, j.text) not in REVIEWED_JOINS |
| 387 | ] |
| 388 | assert not unreviewed, ( |
| 389 | "Found path construction(s) from non-constant input that are not " |
| 390 | "recorded in REVIEWED_JOINS:\n" |
| 391 | + "\n".join(f" [{j.kind}] {j.module}:{j.lineno}: {j.text}" for j in unreviewed) |
| 392 | + "\n\nIf the value can come from an API response, use " |
| 393 | "`composio.utils.safe_path.secure_join(root, *components)` instead. " |
| 394 | "If the construction is genuinely safe, add it to REVIEWED_JOINS in " |
| 395 | f"{Path(__file__).name} with a reason and the validators it relies on." |
| 396 | ) |
| 397 | |
| 398 | |
| 399 | def test_reviewed_joins_all_still_exist(): |
| 400 | """Keeps the allowlist from rotting into stale entries that silently permit |
| 401 | whatever moves into their place.""" |
| 402 | found = {(j.module, j.text) for j in _collect_joins()} |
| 403 | stale = set(REVIEWED_JOINS) - found |
| 404 | assert not stale, ( |
| 405 | "REVIEWED_JOINS entries no longer present in the source (remove them):\n" |
| 406 | + "\n".join(f" {m}: {tx}" for m, tx in sorted(stale)) |
| 407 | ) |
| 408 | |
| 409 | |
| 410 | def test_reviewed_joins_still_have_their_validation(): |
| 411 | """Entries that depend on validators still call them in the same function.""" |
| 412 | for join in _collect_joins(): |
| 413 | entry = REVIEWED_JOINS.get((join.module, join.text)) |
| 414 | if entry is None: |
| 415 | continue |
| 416 | calls = _enclosing_function_calls(join.module, join.lineno) |
| 417 | missing = entry["requires"] - calls |
| 418 | assert not missing, ( |
| 419 | f"{join.module}:{join.lineno}: `{join.text}` is allowlisted because " |
| 420 | f"it is guarded by {sorted(entry['requires'])}, but " |
| 421 | f"{sorted(missing)} is no longer called in the enclosing function. " |
| 422 | "Either restore the validation or re-review the entry." |
| 423 | ) |
| 424 | |
| 425 | |
| 426 | def test_reviewed_joins_occurrence_counts_match(): |
| 427 | """One entry must not blanket-approve unlimited future joins that happen to |
| 428 | share its source text.""" |
| 429 | counts: t.Dict[t.Tuple[str, str], int] = {} |
| 430 | for join in _collect_joins(): |
| 431 | counts[(join.module, join.text)] = counts.get((join.module, join.text), 0) + 1 |
| 432 | for key, entry in REVIEWED_JOINS.items(): |
| 433 | actual = counts.get(key, 0) |
| 434 | assert actual == entry["occurrences"], ( |
| 435 | f"{key[0]}: `{key[1]}` appears {actual} time(s), but the " |
| 436 | f"REVIEWED_JOINS entry expects {entry['occurrences']}. A new " |
| 437 | "occurrence is not covered by the existing review." |
| 438 | ) |
| 439 | |
| 440 | |
| 441 | EVASIONS = { |
| 442 | "div": "return self._outdir / tool.toolkit.slug / tool.slug", |
| 443 | "div-unhinted-name": "return base / tool.slug", |
| 444 | "augdiv": "p = Path('/tmp')\n p /= tool.slug\n return p", |
| 445 | "joinpath": "return self._outdir.joinpath(tool.slug)", |
| 446 | "os.path.join": "return os.path.join(self._outdir, tool.slug)", |
| 447 | "Path(a, b)": "return Path(self._outdir, tool.slug)", |
| 448 | "Path(value)": "return Path(tool.slug)", |
| 449 | "Path(value, literal)": "return Path(tool.slug, 'payload')", |
| 450 | "Path(value).write": "Path(tool.slug).write_bytes(b'x')\n return None", |
| 451 | "f-string": "return Path(f'{self._outdir}/{tool.slug}')", |
| 452 | "concat": "return Path(self._outdir + '/' + tool.slug)", |
| 453 | "local-uppercase": "SLUG = tool.slug\n return self._outdir / SLUG", |
| 454 | "open-direct": "return open(tool.slug, 'rb')", |
| 455 | "open-fstring": "return open(f'{self._outdir}/{tool.slug}', 'rb')", |
| 456 | "mkdir-direct": "return os.mkdir(tool.slug)", |
| 457 | "makedirs-concat": "return os.makedirs(self._outdir + tool.slug)", |
| 458 | } |
| 459 | |
| 460 | |
| 461 | @pytest.mark.parametrize("label", sorted(EVASIONS)) |
| 462 | def test_detector_catches_known_evasions(label, tmp_path): |
| 463 | """Each of these builds a path from untrusted input in a different |
| 464 | spelling. A detector that recognizes only the first stays green for the |
| 465 | rest, which is the whole reason this test is table-driven.""" |
| 466 | pkg = tmp_path / "composio" |
| 467 | pkg.mkdir() |
| 468 | (pkg / "vulnerable.py").write_text( |
| 469 | "import os\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n\n" |
| 470 | f"def f(self, tool):\n {EVASIONS[label]}\n" |
| 471 | ) |
| 472 | found = _collect_joins([pkg]) |
| 473 | assert found, f"detector missed evasion: {label}" |
| 474 | |
| 475 | |
| 476 | def test_module_constant_exemption_requires_a_literal(tmp_path): |
| 477 | """A module-level ALL_CAPS name bound at runtime is not a constant.""" |
| 478 | pkg = tmp_path / "composio" |
| 479 | pkg.mkdir() |
| 480 | (pkg / "vulnerable.py").write_text( |
| 481 | "import os\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\n" |
| 482 | "SAFE = 'literal'\n" |
| 483 | "SLUG = os.environ['SLUG']\n\n\n" |
| 484 | "def f(self):\n return self._outdir / SLUG\n" |
| 485 | ) |
| 486 | assert _collect_joins([pkg]), "runtime-bound ALL_CAPS name was treated as constant" |
| 487 | |
| 488 | (pkg / "vulnerable.py").write_text( |
| 489 | "from pathlib import Path\n\n" |
| 490 | "SAFE = 'literal'\n\n\n" |
| 491 | "def f(self):\n return self._outdir / SAFE\n" |
| 492 | ) |
| 493 | assert not _collect_joins([pkg]), "literal module constant should be exempt" |
| 494 | |
| 495 | |
| 496 | def test_scan_roots_are_pinned(): |
| 497 | """Narrowing the scan silently shrinks the guarantee, so the roots are |
| 498 | asserted rather than assumed.""" |
| 499 | assert {p.name for p in SCANNED_ROOTS} == {"composio", "providers"} |
| 500 | for root in SCANNED_ROOTS: |
| 501 | assert root.is_dir(), f"scanned root missing: {root}" |