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Mirrored from https://github.com/Camo67/composio.git
Synced Nov 21, 04:45 UTC
| 1 | import extractZip from 'extract-zip'; |
| 2 | |
| 3 | /** |
| 4 | * Zip extraction that refuses symlink entries. |
| 5 | * |
| 6 | * `extract-zip` writes a symlink entry without validating its target |
| 7 | * (CVE-2026-56876 / GHSA-jmr9-qjv8-65gv). It does block writes that *traverse* a |
| 8 | * symlink, so an archive cannot plant a file outside the extraction directory, |
| 9 | * but the dangling symlink itself is created — pointing anywhere, including an |
| 10 | * absolute path. Anything that later reads or copies the extracted tree can be |
| 11 | * walked out of it. The advisory has no fixed version: 2.0.1 is the newest |
| 12 | * release, and GitHub records `first_patched_version` as null. |
| 13 | * |
| 14 | * No archive this CLI extracts — release binaries, companion assets, skills — |
| 15 | * legitimately contains a symlink, so rejecting the entry type outright removes |
| 16 | * the vector without narrowing what a valid archive may hold. The check runs |
| 17 | * before the entry is written, so a rejected archive plants nothing. |
| 18 | * |
| 19 | * This is deliberately a local workaround rather than an upstream fix. Refusing |
| 20 | * every symlink suits an application whose archives never carry one, but it |
| 21 | * would break a general-purpose library, where the correct fix is to validate |
| 22 | * that a link's resolved target stays inside the extraction root. That fix is |
| 23 | * already proposed upstream several times over — max-mapper/extract-zip#158, |
| 24 | * #160 and #161 — and none of them has moved: the repository's last commit was |
| 25 | * August 2021, and the issue asking whether a patched release is planned |
| 26 | * (max-mapper/extract-zip#159) has drawn replies only from other stranded |
| 27 | * consumers. Drop this helper once a release actually carries the fix. |
| 28 | */ |
| 29 | |
| 30 | // Unix mode lives in the high 16 bits of a zip entry's external attributes. |
| 31 | const UNIX_MODE_SHIFT = 16; |
| 32 | const FILE_TYPE_MASK = 0o170000; |
| 33 | const SYMLINK_FILE_TYPE = 0o120000; |
| 34 | |
| 35 | export class UnsafeZipEntryError extends Error { |
| 36 | constructor(readonly entryName: string) { |
| 37 | super( |
| 38 | `Refusing to extract archive: "${entryName}" is a symbolic link, which this CLI never ships.` |
| 39 | ); |
| 40 | this.name = 'UnsafeZipEntryError'; |
| 41 | } |
| 42 | } |
| 43 | |
| 44 | /** |
| 45 | * Whether a zip entry's external attributes describe a symbolic link. |
| 46 | * |
| 47 | * Archives written on Windows leave the Unix mode bits empty, which reads as a |
| 48 | * regular file — the correct answer, since such an archive has no symlinks. |
| 49 | */ |
| 50 | export const isSymlinkZipEntry = (externalFileAttributes: number): boolean => |
| 51 | ((externalFileAttributes >>> UNIX_MODE_SHIFT) & FILE_TYPE_MASK) === SYMLINK_FILE_TYPE; |
| 52 | |
| 53 | export const extractZipSafely = (zipPath: string, dir: string): Promise<void> => |
| 54 | extractZip(zipPath, { |
| 55 | dir, |
| 56 | onEntry: entry => { |
| 57 | if (isSymlinkZipEntry(entry.externalFileAttributes)) { |
| 58 | throw new UnsafeZipEntryError(entry.fileName); |
| 59 | } |
| 60 | }, |
| 61 | }); |