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| 1 | import * as Cloudflare from "@alchemy.run/cloudflare"; |
| 2 | import { CloudflareEnvironment } from "@alchemy.run/cloudflare/CloudflareEnvironment"; |
| 3 | import { expect } from "@alchemy.run/test"; |
| 4 | import * as Test from "@alchemy.run/test/Alchemy"; |
| 5 | import * as emailSecurity from "@distilled.cloud/cloudflare/email-security"; |
| 6 | import * as Provider from "alchemy/Provider"; |
| 7 | import * as Effect from "effect/Effect"; |
| 8 | import { MinimumLogLevel } from "effect/References"; |
| 9 | import * as Schedule from "effect/Schedule"; |
| 10 | import * as Stream from "effect/Stream"; |
| 11 | |
| 12 | const { test } = Test.make({ providers: Cloudflare.providers() }); |
| 13 | |
| 14 | const logLevel = Effect.provideService(MinimumLogLevel, process.env.DEBUG ? "Debug" : "Info"); |
| 15 | |
| 16 | // Cloudflare Email Security (Area 1) is an enterprise add-on — the standard |
| 17 | // testing account has no entitlement and every settings call fails with the |
| 18 | // typed `EmailSecurityNotEntitled` error ("Email Security API access is not |
| 19 | // available in the current subscription"). The full lifecycle tests are |
| 20 | // gated behind an entitled account flagged via env. |
| 21 | const entitled = !!process.env.CLOUDFLARE_EMAIL_SECURITY; |
| 22 | |
| 23 | // Entitlement and reachability are different axes. `entitled` says the |
| 24 | // account has bought the add-on; `reachable` says the *credential* carries |
| 25 | // the Email Security scope at all. Cloudflare OAuth carries neither, and an |
| 26 | // unreachable credential is refused at the edge with a bare `Forbidden` |
| 27 | // before any entitlement check happens. |
| 28 | const reachable = !!process.env.CLOUDFLARE_TEST_EMAIL_SECURITY; |
| 29 | |
| 30 | // A freshly minted scoped token propagates eventually-consistently across |
| 31 | // Cloudflare's edge — retry the typed `Forbidden` blips on out-of-band calls. |
| 32 | const forbiddenRetrySchedule = Schedule.exponential("500 millis"); |
| 33 | |
| 34 | const pattern = "alchemy-allow-policy@alchemy-test-2.us"; |
| 35 | |
| 36 | const findByPattern = (accountId: string) => |
| 37 | emailSecurity.listSettingAllowPolicies.items({ accountId, pattern }).pipe( |
| 38 | Stream.runCollect, |
| 39 | Effect.map((chunk) => Array.from(chunk).find((p) => p.pattern === pattern)), |
| 40 | Effect.retry({ |
| 41 | while: (e) => e._tag === "Forbidden", |
| 42 | schedule: forbiddenRetrySchedule, |
| 43 | times: 8, |
| 44 | }), |
| 45 | ); |
| 46 | |
| 47 | // Unentitlement probe — pins the typed EmailSecurityNotEntitled rejection and |
| 48 | // skips on entitled accounts, where the list call would succeed. |
| 49 | // |
| 50 | // Gated: the probe's premise is that the credential can *reach* Email |
| 51 | // Security and be told the account is not entitled. A credential lacking |
| 52 | // the Email Security scope outright (Cloudflare OAuth) never gets that far |
| 53 | // and is refused at the edge instead: |
| 54 | // |
| 55 | // Forbidden: Authentication error |
| 56 | // at matchTypedError (submodules/distilled/packages/core/src/protocol-http.ts) |
| 57 | // |
| 58 | // Set `CLOUDFLARE_TEST_EMAIL_SECURITY=1` with an API-token credential |
| 59 | // carrying the Email Security read scope to run it. |
| 60 | test.provider.skipIf(entitled || !reachable)( |
| 61 | "surfaces the typed EmailSecurityNotEntitled error on unentitled accounts", |
| 62 | (stack) => |
| 63 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 64 | const { accountId } = yield* yield* CloudflareEnvironment; |
| 65 | |
| 66 | yield* stack.destroy(); |
| 67 | |
| 68 | // The testing account lacks the Email Security entitlement — the |
| 69 | // distilled list call must fail with the typed entitlement tag. |
| 70 | const error = yield* emailSecurity.listSettingAllowPolicies.items({ accountId }).pipe( |
| 71 | Stream.runCollect, |
| 72 | Effect.retry({ |
| 73 | while: (e) => e._tag === "Forbidden", |
| 74 | schedule: forbiddenRetrySchedule, |
| 75 | times: 8, |
| 76 | }), |
| 77 | Effect.flip, |
| 78 | ); |
| 79 | expect(error._tag).toEqual("EmailSecurityNotEntitled"); |
| 80 | |
| 81 | yield* stack.destroy(); |
| 82 | }).pipe(logLevel), |
| 83 | { |
| 84 | tags: ["provider:cloudflare", "provider:cloudflare:email", "live"], |
| 85 | timeout: 120_000, |
| 86 | }, |
| 87 | ); |
| 88 | |
| 89 | // Read-only list assertion that runs on every account. On unentitled |
| 90 | // accounts the provider's list() maps the typed EmailSecurityNotEntitled |
| 91 | // rejection to a well-typed empty array; entitled accounts return real rows. |
| 92 | test.provider( |
| 93 | "list enumerates allow policies (read-only)", |
| 94 | (stack) => |
| 95 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 96 | yield* stack.destroy(); |
| 97 | |
| 98 | const provider = yield* Provider.findProvider(Cloudflare.Email.AllowPolicy); |
| 99 | const all = yield* provider.list(); |
| 100 | expect(Array.isArray(all)).toBe(true); |
| 101 | |
| 102 | yield* stack.destroy(); |
| 103 | }).pipe(logLevel), |
| 104 | { |
| 105 | tags: ["provider:cloudflare", "provider:cloudflare:email", "live"], |
| 106 | timeout: 120_000, |
| 107 | }, |
| 108 | ); |
| 109 | |
| 110 | // Requires the Email Security (Area 1) enterprise add-on — unentitled accounts fail |
| 111 | // with the typed EmailSecurityNotEntitled. Unlock with CLOUDFLARE_EMAIL_SECURITY=1. |
| 112 | test.provider.skipIf(!entitled)( |
| 113 | "list includes the deployed allow policy", |
| 114 | (stack) => |
| 115 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 116 | yield* stack.destroy(); |
| 117 | |
| 118 | const deployed = yield* stack.deploy( |
| 119 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 120 | return yield* Cloudflare.Email.AllowPolicy("ListPolicy", { |
| 121 | pattern, |
| 122 | patternType: "EMAIL", |
| 123 | isAcceptableSender: true, |
| 124 | }); |
| 125 | }), |
| 126 | ); |
| 127 | |
| 128 | const provider = yield* Provider.findProvider(Cloudflare.Email.AllowPolicy); |
| 129 | const all = yield* provider.list(); |
| 130 | expect(all.some((p) => p.policyId === deployed.policyId)).toBe(true); |
| 131 | |
| 132 | yield* stack.destroy(); |
| 133 | }).pipe(logLevel), |
| 134 | { |
| 135 | tags: ["provider:cloudflare", "provider:cloudflare:email", "live"], |
| 136 | timeout: 120_000, |
| 137 | }, |
| 138 | ); |
| 139 | |
| 140 | // Requires the Email Security (Area 1) enterprise add-on — unentitled accounts fail |
| 141 | // with the typed EmailSecurityNotEntitled. Unlock with CLOUDFLARE_EMAIL_SECURITY=1. |
| 142 | test.provider.skipIf(!entitled)( |
| 143 | "create, update in place, destroy", |
| 144 | (stack) => |
| 145 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 146 | const { accountId } = yield* yield* CloudflareEnvironment; |
| 147 | |
| 148 | yield* stack.destroy(); |
| 149 | |
| 150 | // Create an acceptable-sender allow policy. |
| 151 | const created = yield* stack.deploy( |
| 152 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 153 | return yield* Cloudflare.Email.AllowPolicy("Policy", { |
| 154 | pattern, |
| 155 | patternType: "EMAIL", |
| 156 | isAcceptableSender: true, |
| 157 | comments: "v1", |
| 158 | }); |
| 159 | }), |
| 160 | ); |
| 161 | expect(created.policyId).toBeDefined(); |
| 162 | expect(created.accountId).toEqual(accountId); |
| 163 | expect(created.pattern).toEqual(pattern); |
| 164 | expect(created.patternType).toEqual("EMAIL"); |
| 165 | expect(created.isAcceptableSender).toEqual(true); |
| 166 | expect(created.isTrustedSender).toEqual(false); |
| 167 | expect(created.verifySender).toEqual(true); |
| 168 | expect(created.comments).toEqual("v1"); |
| 169 | |
| 170 | // Out-of-band verification via the distilled API. |
| 171 | const live = yield* findByPattern(accountId); |
| 172 | expect(live?.id).toEqual(created.policyId); |
| 173 | |
| 174 | // Update mutable fields in place — same physical policy. |
| 175 | const updated = yield* stack.deploy( |
| 176 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 177 | return yield* Cloudflare.Email.AllowPolicy("Policy", { |
| 178 | pattern, |
| 179 | patternType: "EMAIL", |
| 180 | isAcceptableSender: true, |
| 181 | isExemptRecipient: true, |
| 182 | verifySender: false, |
| 183 | comments: "v2", |
| 184 | }); |
| 185 | }), |
| 186 | ); |
| 187 | expect(updated.policyId).toEqual(created.policyId); |
| 188 | expect(updated.isExemptRecipient).toEqual(true); |
| 189 | expect(updated.verifySender).toEqual(false); |
| 190 | expect(updated.comments).toEqual("v2"); |
| 191 | |
| 192 | yield* stack.destroy(); |
| 193 | |
| 194 | // The policy is gone after destroy. |
| 195 | const gone = yield* findByPattern(accountId).pipe( |
| 196 | Effect.repeat({ |
| 197 | schedule: Schedule.spaced("2 seconds"), |
| 198 | until: (p) => p === undefined, |
| 199 | times: 10, |
| 200 | }), |
| 201 | ); |
| 202 | expect(gone).toBeUndefined(); |
| 203 | }).pipe(logLevel), |
| 204 | { |
| 205 | tags: ["provider:cloudflare", "provider:cloudflare:email", "live"], |
| 206 | timeout: 120_000, |
| 207 | }, |
| 208 | ); |