The best way to control Claude Code, Codex and more from any computer or phone
| 1 | import { |
| 2 | AuthAccessTokenType, |
| 3 | AuthAccessWriteScope, |
| 4 | AuthMcpClientAccess, |
| 5 | AuthOrchestrationOperateScope, |
| 6 | AuthAdministrativeClientScopes, |
| 7 | AuthStandardClientScopes, |
| 8 | type AuthAccessTokenResult, |
| 9 | type AuthBrowserSessionResult, |
| 10 | type AuthClientMetadata, |
| 11 | type AuthClientSession, |
| 12 | type AuthConnectDevice, |
| 13 | type AuthCreatePairingCredentialInput, |
| 14 | type AuthEnvironmentScope, |
| 15 | type AuthPairingLink, |
| 16 | type AuthPairingCredentialResult, |
| 17 | type AuthSessionId, |
| 18 | type AuthSessionState, |
| 19 | authScopeResponse, |
| 20 | type ServerAuthDescriptor, |
| 21 | type ServerAuthSessionMethod, |
| 22 | type AuthWebSocketTicketResult, |
| 23 | type AuthWebSocketTicketUse, |
| 24 | DpopFailureReason, |
| 25 | type DpopFailureReason as DpopFailureReasonType, |
| 26 | mcpClientScopes, |
| 27 | } from "@t3tools/contracts"; |
| 28 | import { isLocalLoopbackHost } from "@t3tools/shared/hostClassification"; |
| 29 | import { encodeOAuthScope } from "@t3tools/shared/oauthScope"; |
| 30 | import * as Context from "effect/Context"; |
| 31 | import * as Digest from "effect/crypto/Digest"; |
| 32 | import * as DateTime from "effect/DateTime"; |
| 33 | import * as Duration from "effect/Duration"; |
| 34 | import * as Effect from "effect/Effect"; |
| 35 | import * as Layer from "effect/Layer"; |
| 36 | import * as Option from "effect/Option"; |
| 37 | import * as Redacted from "effect/Redacted"; |
| 38 | import * as Schema from "effect/Schema"; |
| 39 | import * as Semaphore from "effect/Semaphore"; |
| 40 | import * as HttpServerRequest from "effect/http/HttpServerRequest"; |
| 41 | |
| 42 | import * as ServerEnvironment from "../environment/ServerEnvironment.ts"; |
| 43 | import * as ServerConfig from "../config.ts"; |
| 44 | import * as EnvironmentAuthPolicy from "./EnvironmentAuthPolicy.ts"; |
| 45 | import * as PairingGrantStore from "./PairingGrantStore.ts"; |
| 46 | import * as ServerSecretStore from "./ServerSecretStore.ts"; |
| 47 | import * as SessionStore from "./SessionStore.ts"; |
| 48 | import { REUSABLE_DEV_SESSION_EXPIRES_AT, resolveReusableDevAuth } from "./ReusableDevAuth.ts"; |
| 49 | import { verifyRequestDpopProof } from "./dpop.ts"; |
| 50 | import { DESKTOP_RENDERER_ORIGINS } from "../httpCors.ts"; |
| 51 | import * as SqlitePersistence from "../persistence/Sqlite.ts"; |
| 52 | import * as ManagedLimits from "../policy/managedLimits.ts"; |
| 53 | import * as ManagedPolicy from "../policy/ManagedPolicy.ts"; |
| 54 | import { |
| 55 | MCP_APPROVAL_SUBJECT_PREFIX, |
| 56 | PEER_LINK_PAIRING_SUBJECT_PREFIX, |
| 57 | } from "../persistence/AuthPairingLinks.ts"; |
| 58 | import { requestUrl } from "../requestUrl.ts"; |
| 59 | |
| 60 | const DEFAULT_SESSION_SUBJECT = "cli-issued-session"; |
| 61 | export const INTERNAL_ADMINISTRATIVE_BOOTSTRAP_SUBJECT = "administrative-bootstrap"; |
| 62 | /** Sessions and pairing links T3 Connect minted for a device signed in to the linked account. */ |
| 63 | export const CLOUD_CONNECT_SUBJECT = "cloud-connect"; |
| 64 | |
| 65 | export interface IssuedPairingLink { |
| 66 | readonly id: string; |
| 67 | readonly credential: string; |
| 68 | readonly scopes: ReadonlyArray<AuthEnvironmentScope>; |
| 69 | readonly subject: string; |
| 70 | readonly label?: string; |
| 71 | readonly createdAt: DateTime.Utc; |
| 72 | readonly expiresAt: DateTime.Utc; |
| 73 | } |
| 74 | |
| 75 | export interface IssuedBearerSession { |
| 76 | readonly sessionId: AuthSessionId; |
| 77 | readonly token: string; |
| 78 | readonly method: "bearer-access-token"; |
| 79 | readonly scopes: ReadonlyArray<AuthEnvironmentScope>; |
| 80 | readonly subject: string; |
| 81 | readonly client: AuthClientMetadata; |
| 82 | readonly expiresAt: DateTime.Utc; |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | |
| 85 | // MCP client tokens are restricted to /mcp; HTTP API and WebSocket RPC would bypass their access cap. |
| 86 | const MCP_CLIENT_SUBJECT = "mcp-client"; |
| 87 | const MCP_CLIENT_SESSION_TTL = Duration.days(30); |
| 88 | // A peer link's session moves back out to its full lifetime when a call finds it this far |
| 89 | // short, so a used link never expires and a busy one writes at most once per step. |
| 90 | const PEER_LINK_RENEWAL_STEP = Duration.days(1); |
| 91 | |
| 92 | // A device pairing with its DPoP key renews the session itself, so the token can be short and |
| 93 | // the device stays signed in while used. One idle for the whole window pairs again. |
| 94 | const RENEWABLE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL = Duration.hours(1); |
| 95 | const RENEWABLE_SESSION_WINDOW = Duration.days(30); |
| 96 | const PAIRING_LINK_SUBJECT = "one-time-token"; |
| 97 | |
| 98 | export interface McpClientSession { |
| 99 | readonly sessionId: AuthSessionId; |
| 100 | readonly label: string; |
| 101 | readonly access: AuthMcpClientAccess; |
| 102 | /** Another T3 Code environment's link, whose work here stays within it. */ |
| 103 | readonly peerLink: boolean; |
| 104 | /** When a peer link's session ends unless it is used again; the linking side keeps this. */ |
| 105 | readonly linkExpiresAt?: DateTime.Utc; |
| 106 | } |
| 107 | |
| 108 | export interface AuthenticatedSession { |
| 109 | readonly sessionId: AuthSessionId; |
| 110 | readonly subject: string; |
| 111 | readonly method: ServerAuthSessionMethod; |
| 112 | readonly scopes: ReadonlyArray<AuthEnvironmentScope>; |
| 113 | readonly proofKeyThumbprint?: string; |
| 114 | readonly expiresAt?: DateTime.DateTime; |
| 115 | } |
| 116 | |
| 117 | const serverAuthInternalErrorContext = { |
| 118 | cause: Schema.Defect(), |
| 119 | }; |
| 120 | |
| 121 | export class ServerAuthBootstrapCredentialValidationError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthBootstrapCredentialValidationError>()( |
| 122 | "ServerAuthBootstrapCredentialValidationError", |
| 123 | { |
| 124 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 125 | }, |
| 126 | ) { |
| 127 | override get message(): string { |
| 128 | return "Failed to validate bootstrap credential."; |
| 129 | } |
| 130 | } |
| 131 | |
| 132 | export class ServerAuthSessionCredentialValidationError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthSessionCredentialValidationError>()( |
| 133 | "ServerAuthSessionCredentialValidationError", |
| 134 | { |
| 135 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 136 | }, |
| 137 | ) { |
| 138 | override get message(): string { |
| 139 | return "Failed to validate session credential."; |
| 140 | } |
| 141 | } |
| 142 | |
| 143 | export class ServerAuthAuthenticatedSessionIssueError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthAuthenticatedSessionIssueError>()( |
| 144 | "ServerAuthAuthenticatedSessionIssueError", |
| 145 | { |
| 146 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 147 | }, |
| 148 | ) { |
| 149 | override get message(): string { |
| 150 | return "Failed to issue authenticated session."; |
| 151 | } |
| 152 | } |
| 153 | |
| 154 | export class ServerAuthAuthenticatedAccessTokenIssueError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthAuthenticatedAccessTokenIssueError>()( |
| 155 | "ServerAuthAuthenticatedAccessTokenIssueError", |
| 156 | { |
| 157 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 158 | }, |
| 159 | ) { |
| 160 | override get message(): string { |
| 161 | return "Failed to issue authenticated access token."; |
| 162 | } |
| 163 | } |
| 164 | |
| 165 | export class ServerAuthPairingLinkCreationError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthPairingLinkCreationError>()( |
| 166 | "ServerAuthPairingLinkCreationError", |
| 167 | { |
| 168 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 169 | }, |
| 170 | ) { |
| 171 | override get message(): string { |
| 172 | return "Failed to create pairing link."; |
| 173 | } |
| 174 | } |
| 175 | |
| 176 | export class ServerAuthPairingLinksListError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthPairingLinksListError>()( |
| 177 | "ServerAuthPairingLinksListError", |
| 178 | { |
| 179 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 180 | }, |
| 181 | ) { |
| 182 | override get message(): string { |
| 183 | return "Failed to list pairing links."; |
| 184 | } |
| 185 | } |
| 186 | |
| 187 | export class ServerAuthPairingLinkRevocationError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthPairingLinkRevocationError>()( |
| 188 | "ServerAuthPairingLinkRevocationError", |
| 189 | { |
| 190 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 191 | }, |
| 192 | ) { |
| 193 | override get message(): string { |
| 194 | return "Failed to revoke pairing link."; |
| 195 | } |
| 196 | } |
| 197 | |
| 198 | export class ServerAuthSessionTokenIssueError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthSessionTokenIssueError>()( |
| 199 | "ServerAuthSessionTokenIssueError", |
| 200 | { |
| 201 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 202 | }, |
| 203 | ) { |
| 204 | override get message(): string { |
| 205 | return "Failed to issue session token."; |
| 206 | } |
| 207 | } |
| 208 | |
| 209 | export class ServerAuthSessionsListError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthSessionsListError>()( |
| 210 | "ServerAuthSessionsListError", |
| 211 | { |
| 212 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 213 | }, |
| 214 | ) { |
| 215 | override get message(): string { |
| 216 | return "Failed to list sessions."; |
| 217 | } |
| 218 | } |
| 219 | |
| 220 | export class ServerAuthSessionRevocationError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthSessionRevocationError>()( |
| 221 | "ServerAuthSessionRevocationError", |
| 222 | { |
| 223 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 224 | }, |
| 225 | ) { |
| 226 | override get message(): string { |
| 227 | return "Failed to revoke session."; |
| 228 | } |
| 229 | } |
| 230 | |
| 231 | export class ServerAuthOtherSessionsRevocationError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthOtherSessionsRevocationError>()( |
| 232 | "ServerAuthOtherSessionsRevocationError", |
| 233 | { |
| 234 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 235 | }, |
| 236 | ) { |
| 237 | override get message(): string { |
| 238 | return "Failed to revoke other sessions."; |
| 239 | } |
| 240 | } |
| 241 | |
| 242 | export class ServerAuthWebSocketTokenIssueError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthWebSocketTokenIssueError>()( |
| 243 | "ServerAuthWebSocketTokenIssueError", |
| 244 | { |
| 245 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 246 | }, |
| 247 | ) { |
| 248 | override get message(): string { |
| 249 | return "Failed to issue websocket token."; |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | } |
| 252 | |
| 253 | export class ServerAuthDpopReplayStateRecordError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthDpopReplayStateRecordError>()( |
| 254 | "ServerAuthDpopReplayStateRecordError", |
| 255 | { |
| 256 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 257 | }, |
| 258 | ) { |
| 259 | override get message(): string { |
| 260 | return "Failed to record DPoP proof replay state."; |
| 261 | } |
| 262 | } |
| 263 | |
| 264 | export class ServerAuthDpopReplayKeyCalculationError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthDpopReplayKeyCalculationError>()( |
| 265 | "ServerAuthDpopReplayKeyCalculationError", |
| 266 | { |
| 267 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 268 | }, |
| 269 | ) { |
| 270 | override get message(): string { |
| 271 | return "Failed to calculate DPoP replay key."; |
| 272 | } |
| 273 | } |
| 274 | |
| 275 | export class ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountVerificationError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountVerificationError>()( |
| 276 | "ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountVerificationError", |
| 277 | { |
| 278 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 279 | }, |
| 280 | ) { |
| 281 | override get message(): string { |
| 282 | return "Could not verify the linked cloud account."; |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | } |
| 285 | |
| 286 | export class ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountReadError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountReadError>()( |
| 287 | "ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountReadError", |
| 288 | { |
| 289 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 290 | }, |
| 291 | ) { |
| 292 | override get message(): string { |
| 293 | return "Could not read the linked cloud account."; |
| 294 | } |
| 295 | } |
| 296 | |
| 297 | export class ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountMissingError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountMissingError>()( |
| 298 | "ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountMissingError", |
| 299 | {}, |
| 300 | ) { |
| 301 | override get message(): string { |
| 302 | return "Cloud linked user is not installed for this environment."; |
| 303 | } |
| 304 | } |
| 305 | |
| 306 | export class ServerAuthCloudLinkJwtSigningError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthCloudLinkJwtSigningError>()( |
| 307 | "ServerAuthCloudLinkJwtSigningError", |
| 308 | { |
| 309 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 310 | }, |
| 311 | ) { |
| 312 | override get message(): string { |
| 313 | return "Failed to sign cloud link JWT."; |
| 314 | } |
| 315 | } |
| 316 | |
| 317 | export class ServerAuthCloudMintPublicKeyMissingError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthCloudMintPublicKeyMissingError>()( |
| 318 | "ServerAuthCloudMintPublicKeyMissingError", |
| 319 | {}, |
| 320 | ) { |
| 321 | override get message(): string { |
| 322 | return "Cloud mint public key is not installed for this environment."; |
| 323 | } |
| 324 | } |
| 325 | |
| 326 | export class ServerAuthCloudRelayIssuerMissingError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthCloudRelayIssuerMissingError>()( |
| 327 | "ServerAuthCloudRelayIssuerMissingError", |
| 328 | {}, |
| 329 | ) { |
| 330 | override get message(): string { |
| 331 | return "Cloud relay issuer is not installed for this environment."; |
| 332 | } |
| 333 | } |
| 334 | |
| 335 | export class ServerAuthCloudHealthJwtSigningError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthCloudHealthJwtSigningError>()( |
| 336 | "ServerAuthCloudHealthJwtSigningError", |
| 337 | { |
| 338 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 339 | }, |
| 340 | ) { |
| 341 | override get message(): string { |
| 342 | return "Failed to sign cloud health JWT."; |
| 343 | } |
| 344 | } |
| 345 | |
| 346 | export class ServerAuthCloudMintJwtSigningError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthCloudMintJwtSigningError>()( |
| 347 | "ServerAuthCloudMintJwtSigningError", |
| 348 | { |
| 349 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 350 | }, |
| 351 | ) { |
| 352 | override get message(): string { |
| 353 | return "Failed to sign cloud mint JWT."; |
| 354 | } |
| 355 | } |
| 356 | |
| 357 | export class ServerAuthConnectDevicesError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthConnectDevicesError>()( |
| 358 | "ServerAuthConnectDevicesError", |
| 359 | { |
| 360 | ...serverAuthInternalErrorContext, |
| 361 | }, |
| 362 | ) { |
| 363 | override get message(): string { |
| 364 | return "Failed to update T3 Connect devices."; |
| 365 | } |
| 366 | } |
| 367 | |
| 368 | export const ServerAuthInternalError = Schema.Union([ |
| 369 | ServerAuthBootstrapCredentialValidationError, |
| 370 | ServerAuthSessionCredentialValidationError, |
| 371 | ServerAuthAuthenticatedSessionIssueError, |
| 372 | ServerAuthAuthenticatedAccessTokenIssueError, |
| 373 | ServerAuthPairingLinkCreationError, |
| 374 | ServerAuthPairingLinksListError, |
| 375 | ServerAuthPairingLinkRevocationError, |
| 376 | ServerAuthSessionTokenIssueError, |
| 377 | ServerAuthSessionsListError, |
| 378 | ServerAuthSessionRevocationError, |
| 379 | ServerAuthOtherSessionsRevocationError, |
| 380 | ServerAuthWebSocketTokenIssueError, |
| 381 | ServerAuthDpopReplayStateRecordError, |
| 382 | ServerAuthDpopReplayKeyCalculationError, |
| 383 | ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountVerificationError, |
| 384 | ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountReadError, |
| 385 | ServerAuthLinkedCloudAccountMissingError, |
| 386 | ServerAuthCloudLinkJwtSigningError, |
| 387 | ServerAuthCloudMintPublicKeyMissingError, |
| 388 | ServerAuthCloudRelayIssuerMissingError, |
| 389 | ServerAuthCloudHealthJwtSigningError, |
| 390 | ServerAuthCloudMintJwtSigningError, |
| 391 | ServerAuthConnectDevicesError, |
| 392 | ]); |
| 393 | export type ServerAuthInternalError = typeof ServerAuthInternalError.Type; |
| 394 | export const isServerAuthInternalError = Schema.is(ServerAuthInternalError); |
| 395 | |
| 396 | export class ServerAuthMissingCredentialError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthMissingCredentialError>()( |
| 397 | "ServerAuthMissingCredentialError", |
| 398 | {}, |
| 399 | ) { |
| 400 | override get message(): string { |
| 401 | return "Server authentication credential is missing."; |
| 402 | } |
| 403 | } |
| 404 | |
| 405 | export class ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError>()( |
| 406 | "ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError", |
| 407 | { |
| 408 | diagnostic: Schema.optional(Schema.String), |
| 409 | dpopFailureReason: Schema.optionalKey(DpopFailureReason), |
| 410 | cause: Schema.optional(Schema.Defect()), |
| 411 | }, |
| 412 | ) { |
| 413 | override get message(): string { |
| 414 | return "Server authentication credential is invalid."; |
| 415 | } |
| 416 | } |
| 417 | |
| 418 | export const ServerAuthCredentialError = Schema.Union([ |
| 419 | ServerAuthMissingCredentialError, |
| 420 | ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError, |
| 421 | ]); |
| 422 | export type ServerAuthCredentialError = typeof ServerAuthCredentialError.Type; |
| 423 | export const isServerAuthCredentialError = Schema.is(ServerAuthCredentialError); |
| 424 | export const serverAuthCredentialReason = ( |
| 425 | error: ServerAuthCredentialError, |
| 426 | ): "missing_credential" | "invalid_credential" => |
| 427 | error._tag === "ServerAuthMissingCredentialError" ? "missing_credential" : "invalid_credential"; |
| 428 | |
| 429 | export const serverAuthDpopFailureReason = ( |
| 430 | error: ServerAuthCredentialError, |
| 431 | ): DpopFailureReasonType | undefined => |
| 432 | error._tag === "ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError" ? error.dpopFailureReason : undefined; |
| 433 | |
| 434 | export class ServerAuthInvalidScopeError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthInvalidScopeError>()( |
| 435 | "ServerAuthInvalidScopeError", |
| 436 | {}, |
| 437 | ) { |
| 438 | override get message(): string { |
| 439 | return "The requested authentication scope is invalid."; |
| 440 | } |
| 441 | } |
| 442 | |
| 443 | export class ServerAuthScopeNotGrantedError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthScopeNotGrantedError>()( |
| 444 | "ServerAuthScopeNotGrantedError", |
| 445 | {}, |
| 446 | ) { |
| 447 | override get message(): string { |
| 448 | return "The requested authentication scope was not granted."; |
| 449 | } |
| 450 | } |
| 451 | |
| 452 | export const ServerAuthInvalidRequestError = Schema.Union([ |
| 453 | ServerAuthInvalidScopeError, |
| 454 | ServerAuthScopeNotGrantedError, |
| 455 | ]); |
| 456 | export type ServerAuthInvalidRequestError = typeof ServerAuthInvalidRequestError.Type; |
| 457 | export const isServerAuthInvalidRequestError = Schema.is(ServerAuthInvalidRequestError); |
| 458 | export const serverAuthInvalidRequestReason = ( |
| 459 | error: ServerAuthInvalidRequestError, |
| 460 | ): "invalid_scope" | "scope_not_granted" => |
| 461 | error._tag === "ServerAuthInvalidScopeError" ? "invalid_scope" : "scope_not_granted"; |
| 462 | |
| 463 | /** The credential is fine, but the host has not approved this T3 Connect device yet. */ |
| 464 | export class ServerAuthConnectApprovalPendingError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthConnectApprovalPendingError>()( |
| 465 | "ServerAuthConnectApprovalPendingError", |
| 466 | {}, |
| 467 | ) { |
| 468 | override get message(): string { |
| 469 | return "This T3 Connect device is waiting for approval."; |
| 470 | } |
| 471 | } |
| 472 | |
| 473 | export class ServerAuthMcpApprovalCodeError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthMcpApprovalCodeError>()( |
| 474 | "ServerAuthMcpApprovalCodeError", |
| 475 | { reason: Schema.Literals(["unknown_or_used", "not_a_pairing_code", "insufficient_scope"]) }, |
| 476 | ) { |
| 477 | override get message(): string { |
| 478 | return this.reason === "insufficient_scope" |
| 479 | ? "That pairing code cannot grant this access. It has not been used, so choose an access level it grants, or create a code with the standard scopes." |
| 480 | : this.reason === "not_a_pairing_code" |
| 481 | ? "That is not a one-time pairing code." |
| 482 | : "That pairing code is unknown, expired, or already used."; |
| 483 | } |
| 484 | } |
| 485 | |
| 486 | export class ServerAuthForbiddenOperationError extends Schema.TaggedError<ServerAuthForbiddenOperationError>()( |
| 487 | "ServerAuthForbiddenOperationError", |
| 488 | {}, |
| 489 | ) { |
| 490 | override get message(): string { |
| 491 | return "The current authentication session cannot revoke itself."; |
| 492 | } |
| 493 | } |
| 494 | |
| 495 | export class EnvironmentAuth extends Context.Service< |
| 496 | EnvironmentAuth, |
| 497 | { |
| 498 | readonly getDescriptor: () => Effect.Effect<ServerAuthDescriptor>; |
| 499 | readonly getSessionState: ( |
| 500 | request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest, |
| 501 | ) => Effect.Effect<AuthSessionState, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 502 | readonly createBrowserSession: ( |
| 503 | credential: string, |
| 504 | requestMetadata: AuthClientMetadata, |
| 505 | previousSessionToken?: string, |
| 506 | ) => Effect.Effect< |
| 507 | { |
| 508 | readonly response: AuthBrowserSessionResult; |
| 509 | readonly sessionToken: string; |
| 510 | readonly cookieName?: string; |
| 511 | readonly expireNormalCookie?: boolean; |
| 512 | }, |
| 513 | ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 514 | >; |
| 515 | readonly exchangeBootstrapCredentialForAccessToken: ( |
| 516 | credential: string, |
| 517 | requestedScopes: ReadonlyArray<AuthEnvironmentScope> | undefined, |
| 518 | requestMetadata: AuthClientMetadata, |
| 519 | input?: { |
| 520 | readonly proofKeyThumbprint?: string; |
| 521 | }, |
| 522 | ) => Effect.Effect< |
| 523 | AuthAccessTokenResult, |
| 524 | | ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError |
| 525 | | ServerAuthInvalidRequestError |
| 526 | | ServerAuthConnectApprovalPendingError |
| 527 | | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 528 | >; |
| 529 | readonly renewAccessToken: ( |
| 530 | accessToken: string, |
| 531 | proofKeyThumbprint: string, |
| 532 | consumeProof: Effect.Effect<void, ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError>, |
| 533 | ) => Effect.Effect< |
| 534 | AuthAccessTokenResult, |
| 535 | ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 536 | >; |
| 537 | readonly createPairingLink: (input?: { |
| 538 | readonly ttl?: Duration.Duration; |
| 539 | readonly label?: string; |
| 540 | readonly scopes?: ReadonlyArray<AuthEnvironmentScope>; |
| 541 | readonly subject?: string; |
| 542 | readonly proofKeyThumbprint?: string; |
| 543 | readonly purpose?: "startup"; |
| 544 | readonly mcpApproval?: AuthMcpClientAccess; |
| 545 | readonly requiresConnectApproval?: boolean; |
| 546 | }) => Effect.Effect< |
| 547 | IssuedPairingLink, |
| 548 | ServerAuthInternalError | ManagedLimits.ManagedPolicyRefusedError |
| 549 | >; |
| 550 | /** |
| 551 | * The one-time credential T3 Connect hands a device. With approval required, an untrusted |
| 552 | * device key gets one that waits for approval, and keeps it across retries. |
| 553 | */ |
| 554 | readonly issueConnectCredential: (input: { |
| 555 | readonly proofKeyThumbprint: string; |
| 556 | readonly requireApproval: boolean; |
| 557 | }) => Effect.Effect< |
| 558 | { readonly credential: string; readonly expiresAt: DateTime.Utc }, |
| 559 | ServerAuthInternalError | ManagedLimits.ManagedPolicyRefusedError |
| 560 | >; |
| 561 | readonly approveConnectDevice: ( |
| 562 | pairingLinkId: string, |
| 563 | ) => Effect.Effect<boolean, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 564 | /** Pairing link ids of waiting devices that show this code; more than one is ambiguous. */ |
| 565 | readonly connectRequestsShowingCode: ( |
| 566 | verificationCode: string, |
| 567 | ) => Effect.Effect<ReadonlyArray<string>, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 568 | /** Trusted devices that show this code; more than one is ambiguous. */ |
| 569 | readonly connectDevicesShowingCode: ( |
| 570 | verificationCode: string, |
| 571 | ) => Effect.Effect<ReadonlyArray<AuthConnectDevice>, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 572 | readonly listConnectDevices: () => Effect.Effect< |
| 573 | ReadonlyArray<AuthConnectDevice>, |
| 574 | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 575 | >; |
| 576 | /** Stops trusting a device key and ends the sessions it holds. */ |
| 577 | readonly revokeConnectDevice: ( |
| 578 | proofKeyThumbprint: string, |
| 579 | ) => Effect.Effect<boolean, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 580 | readonly issuePairingCredential: ( |
| 581 | input?: AuthCreatePairingCredentialInput, |
| 582 | ) => Effect.Effect< |
| 583 | AuthPairingCredentialResult, |
| 584 | ServerAuthInternalError | ManagedLimits.ManagedPolicyRefusedError |
| 585 | >; |
| 586 | readonly issueStartupPairingCredential: () => Effect.Effect< |
| 587 | AuthPairingCredentialResult, |
| 588 | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 589 | >; |
| 590 | readonly listPairingLinks: (input?: { |
| 591 | readonly excludeSubjects?: ReadonlyArray<string>; |
| 592 | }) => Effect.Effect<ReadonlyArray<AuthPairingLink>, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 593 | readonly revokePairingLink: (id: string) => Effect.Effect<boolean, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 594 | readonly issueSession: (input?: { |
| 595 | readonly ttl?: Duration.Duration; |
| 596 | readonly subject?: string; |
| 597 | readonly scopes?: ReadonlyArray<AuthEnvironmentScope>; |
| 598 | readonly label?: string; |
| 599 | }) => Effect.Effect<IssuedBearerSession, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 600 | readonly listSessions: () => Effect.Effect< |
| 601 | ReadonlyArray<AuthClientSession>, |
| 602 | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 603 | >; |
| 604 | readonly revokeSession: ( |
| 605 | sessionId: AuthSessionId, |
| 606 | ) => Effect.Effect<boolean, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 607 | readonly listClientSessions: ( |
| 608 | currentSessionId: AuthSessionId, |
| 609 | ) => Effect.Effect<ReadonlyArray<AuthClientSession>, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 610 | /** Revokes a session; one bound to a device key takes the device's trust and sessions with it. */ |
| 611 | readonly revokeClient: ( |
| 612 | sessionId: AuthSessionId, |
| 613 | ) => Effect.Effect<boolean, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 614 | readonly revokeClientSession: ( |
| 615 | currentSessionId: AuthSessionId, |
| 616 | targetSessionId: AuthSessionId, |
| 617 | ) => Effect.Effect<boolean, ServerAuthForbiddenOperationError | ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 618 | readonly revokeOtherClientSessions: ( |
| 619 | currentSessionId: AuthSessionId, |
| 620 | ) => Effect.Effect<number, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 621 | readonly authenticateHttpRequest: ( |
| 622 | request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest, |
| 623 | ) => Effect.Effect<AuthenticatedSession, ServerAuthCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 624 | readonly authenticateWebSocketUpgrade: ( |
| 625 | request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest, |
| 626 | use: AuthWebSocketTicketUse, |
| 627 | ) => Effect.Effect<AuthenticatedSession, ServerAuthCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 628 | readonly issueWebSocketTicket: ( |
| 629 | session: Pick<AuthenticatedSession, "sessionId" | "proofKeyThumbprint">, |
| 630 | input?: { readonly use?: AuthWebSocketTicketUse }, |
| 631 | ) => Effect.Effect<AuthWebSocketTicketResult, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 632 | readonly issueStartupPairingUrl: ( |
| 633 | baseUrl: string, |
| 634 | ) => Effect.Effect<string, ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 635 | readonly authenticateMcpClient: ( |
| 636 | request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest, |
| 637 | ) => Effect.Effect<McpClientSession, ServerAuthCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError>; |
| 638 | readonly issueMcpClientSession: (input: { |
| 639 | readonly label: string; |
| 640 | readonly access: AuthMcpClientAccess; |
| 641 | readonly peerLink: boolean; |
| 642 | readonly client: AuthClientMetadata; |
| 643 | }) => Effect.Effect< |
| 644 | { |
| 645 | readonly sessionId: AuthSessionId; |
| 646 | readonly token: string; |
| 647 | readonly expiresAt: DateTime.DateTime; |
| 648 | }, |
| 649 | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 650 | >; |
| 651 | /** |
| 652 | * Spends a code covering all granted scopes and returns the level it approves. A level-bound |
| 653 | * code must name `access`. Rejects desktop grants and leaves refused codes unspent. |
| 654 | */ |
| 655 | readonly consumeMcpApprovalCode: ( |
| 656 | code: string, |
| 657 | access: AuthMcpClientAccess, |
| 658 | peerLink?: boolean, |
| 659 | ) => Effect.Effect< |
| 660 | AuthMcpClientAccess, |
| 661 | ServerAuthMcpApprovalCodeError | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 662 | >; |
| 663 | } |
| 664 | >()("t3/auth/EnvironmentAuth") {} |
| 665 | |
| 666 | type BootstrapExchangeResult = { |
| 667 | readonly response: AuthBrowserSessionResult; |
| 668 | readonly sessionToken: string; |
| 669 | readonly cookieName?: string; |
| 670 | readonly expireNormalCookie?: boolean; |
| 671 | }; |
| 672 | |
| 673 | const AUTHORIZATION_PREFIX = "Bearer "; |
| 674 | const DPOP_AUTHORIZATION_PREFIX = "DPoP "; |
| 675 | const WebSocketUpgradeQuery = Schema.Struct({ |
| 676 | wsTicket: Schema.optionalKey(Schema.RedactedFromValue(Schema.String)), |
| 677 | dpop: Schema.optionalKey(Schema.RedactedFromValue(Schema.String)), |
| 678 | }); |
| 679 | const decodeWebSocketUpgradeQuery = Schema.decodeEffect(WebSocketUpgradeQuery); |
| 680 | |
| 681 | const bySessionPriority = (left: AuthClientSession, right: AuthClientSession) => { |
| 682 | const leftCanManage = left.scopes.includes(AuthAccessWriteScope); |
| 683 | const rightCanManage = right.scopes.includes(AuthAccessWriteScope); |
| 684 | if (leftCanManage !== rightCanManage) { |
| 685 | return leftCanManage ? -1 : 1; |
| 686 | } |
| 687 | if (left.connected !== right.connected) { |
| 688 | return left.connected ? -1 : 1; |
| 689 | } |
| 690 | return right.issuedAt.epochMilliseconds - left.issuedAt.epochMilliseconds; |
| 691 | }; |
| 692 | |
| 693 | function toBootstrapExchangeError( |
| 694 | cause: PairingGrantStore.BootstrapCredentialError, |
| 695 | ): ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError { |
| 696 | if (PairingGrantStore.isBootstrapCredentialInternalError(cause)) { |
| 697 | return new ServerAuthBootstrapCredentialValidationError({ cause }); |
| 698 | } |
| 699 | |
| 700 | return new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ |
| 701 | cause, |
| 702 | }); |
| 703 | } |
| 704 | |
| 705 | const rejectMcpClientAudience = <S extends { readonly subject: string }>(session: S) => |
| 706 | session.subject === MCP_CLIENT_SUBJECT |
| 707 | ? Effect.fail( |
| 708 | new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ |
| 709 | diagnostic: "MCP client sessions are only accepted by the MCP endpoint.", |
| 710 | }), |
| 711 | ).pipe(Effect.tap(() => Effect.logWarning("Rejected an MCP client session outside /mcp."))) |
| 712 | : Effect.succeed(session); |
| 713 | |
| 714 | const toSessionVerificationError = (cause: SessionStore.SessionCredentialError) => |
| 715 | SessionStore.isSessionCredentialInvalidError(cause) |
| 716 | ? new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ cause }) |
| 717 | : new ServerAuthSessionCredentialValidationError({ cause }); |
| 718 | |
| 719 | const mapSessionVerificationErrors = <A, R>( |
| 720 | effect: Effect.Effect<A, SessionStore.SessionCredentialError, R>, |
| 721 | ): Effect.Effect<A, ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError, R> => |
| 722 | effect.pipe(Effect.mapError(toSessionVerificationError)); |
| 723 | |
| 724 | export function parseBearerToken(request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest): string | null { |
| 725 | const header = request.headers["authorization"]; |
| 726 | if (typeof header !== "string" || !/^Bearer /i.test(header)) { |
| 727 | return null; |
| 728 | } |
| 729 | const token = header.slice(AUTHORIZATION_PREFIX.length).trim(); |
| 730 | return token.length > 0 ? token : null; |
| 731 | } |
| 732 | |
| 733 | function parseDpopToken(request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest): string | null { |
| 734 | const header = request.headers["authorization"]; |
| 735 | if (typeof header !== "string" || !/^DPoP /i.test(header)) { |
| 736 | return null; |
| 737 | } |
| 738 | const token = header.slice(DPOP_AUTHORIZATION_PREFIX.length).trim(); |
| 739 | return token.length > 0 ? token : null; |
| 740 | } |
| 741 | |
| 742 | export function selectRequestCredential( |
| 743 | request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest, |
| 744 | cookieName: string, |
| 745 | legacyCookieName: string | undefined, |
| 746 | ) { |
| 747 | const cookieToken = request.cookies[cookieName]; |
| 748 | if (cookieToken) { |
| 749 | return { token: cookieToken, source: "cookie" } as const; |
| 750 | } |
| 751 | |
| 752 | const bearerToken = parseBearerToken(request); |
| 753 | if (bearerToken !== null) { |
| 754 | return { token: bearerToken, source: "bearer" } as const; |
| 755 | } |
| 756 | |
| 757 | const dpopToken = parseDpopToken(request); |
| 758 | if (dpopToken !== null) { |
| 759 | return { token: dpopToken, source: "dpop" } as const; |
| 760 | } |
| 761 | |
| 762 | const legacyToken = legacyCookieName ? request.cookies[legacyCookieName] : undefined; |
| 763 | if (legacyToken !== undefined) { |
| 764 | return { token: legacyToken, source: "legacy-cookie" } as const; |
| 765 | } |
| 766 | |
| 767 | return undefined; |
| 768 | } |
| 769 | |
| 770 | type RequestCredentialSource = NonNullable<ReturnType<typeof selectRequestCredential>>["source"]; |
| 771 | |
| 772 | export const isBrowserCookieCredential = (source: RequestCredentialSource | "dev-cookie") => |
| 773 | source === "cookie" || source === "legacy-cookie" || source === "dev-cookie"; |
| 774 | |
| 775 | function firstHeaderValue(value: string | undefined): string | undefined { |
| 776 | const first = value?.split(",")[0]?.trim().toLowerCase(); |
| 777 | return first && first.length > 0 ? first : undefined; |
| 778 | } |
| 779 | |
| 780 | // Missing Origin allows same-origin reads and non-browser clients; otherwise require |
| 781 | // same-origin Sec-Fetch-Site, this server's host (including X-Forwarded-Host), or a trusted app origin. |
| 782 | function isBrowserOriginAllowed( |
| 783 | request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest, |
| 784 | trustedOrigins: ReadonlySet<string>, |
| 785 | ): boolean { |
| 786 | const origin = request.headers.origin; |
| 787 | if (origin === undefined) return true; |
| 788 | if (request.headers["sec-fetch-site"] === "same-origin") return true; |
| 789 | if (trustedOrigins.has(origin)) return true; |
| 790 | let originHost: string; |
| 791 | try { |
| 792 | originHost = new URL(origin).host.toLowerCase(); |
| 793 | } catch { |
| 794 | return false; |
| 795 | } |
| 796 | if (originHost === "") return false; |
| 797 | return ( |
| 798 | originHost === firstHeaderValue(request.headers.host) || |
| 799 | originHost === firstHeaderValue(request.headers["x-forwarded-host"]) |
| 800 | ); |
| 801 | } |
| 802 | |
| 803 | /** @public */ |
| 804 | export const make = Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 805 | const policy = yield* EnvironmentAuthPolicy.EnvironmentAuthPolicy; |
| 806 | const bootstrapCredentials = yield* PairingGrantStore.PairingGrantStore; |
| 807 | const sessions = yield* SessionStore.SessionStore; |
| 808 | const secretStore = yield* ServerSecretStore.ServerSecretStore; |
| 809 | const digest = yield* Digest.Digest; |
| 810 | const descriptor = yield* policy.getDescriptor(); |
| 811 | const config = yield* ServerConfig.ServerConfig; |
| 812 | const managedPolicy = yield* ManagedPolicy.ManagedPolicy; |
| 813 | const devAuth = resolveReusableDevAuth(config); |
| 814 | |
| 815 | const authenticateToken = ( |
| 816 | token: string, |
| 817 | ): Effect.Effect< |
| 818 | AuthenticatedSession, |
| 819 | ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 820 | > => |
| 821 | sessions.verify(token).pipe( |
| 822 | Effect.tapError((cause) => |
| 823 | SessionStore.isSessionCredentialInvalidError(cause) |
| 824 | ? Effect.logWarning("Rejected authenticated session credential.").pipe( |
| 825 | Effect.annotateLogs({ |
| 826 | reason: cause.message, |
| 827 | }), |
| 828 | ) |
| 829 | : Effect.void, |
| 830 | ), |
| 831 | mapSessionVerificationErrors, |
| 832 | Effect.flatMap(rejectMcpClientAudience), |
| 833 | Effect.map((session) => ({ |
| 834 | sessionId: session.sessionId, |
| 835 | subject: session.subject, |
| 836 | method: session.method, |
| 837 | scopes: session.scopes, |
| 838 | ...(session.proofKeyThumbprint ? { proofKeyThumbprint: session.proofKeyThumbprint } : {}), |
| 839 | ...(session.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: session.expiresAt } : {}), |
| 840 | })), |
| 841 | ); |
| 842 | |
| 843 | const resolveRequestCredential = (request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest) => { |
| 844 | const selectedCredential = selectRequestCredential( |
| 845 | request, |
| 846 | sessions.cookieName, |
| 847 | sessions.legacyCookieName, |
| 848 | ); |
| 849 | const hasAuthorization = request.headers.authorization !== undefined; |
| 850 | const devCookieToken = devAuth ? request.cookies[devAuth.cookieName] : undefined; |
| 851 | return ( |
| 852 | selectedCredential ?? |
| 853 | (!hasAuthorization && devCookieToken !== undefined |
| 854 | ? { token: devCookieToken, source: "dev-cookie" as const } |
| 855 | : undefined) |
| 856 | ); |
| 857 | }; |
| 858 | |
| 859 | // Cookies span ports; reject cookie-authenticated requests and sockets from other same-site origins. |
| 860 | const trustedBrowserOrigins = new Set<string>([ |
| 861 | ...(config.devUrl ? [config.devUrl.origin] : []), |
| 862 | ...DESKTOP_RENDERER_ORIGINS, |
| 863 | ...config.devAllowedOrigins, |
| 864 | ]); |
| 865 | |
| 866 | const authenticateRequest = ( |
| 867 | request: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest, |
| 868 | ): Effect.Effect<AuthenticatedSession, ServerAuthCredentialError | ServerAuthInternalError> => { |
| 869 | const dpopToken = parseDpopToken(request); |
| 870 | const credential = resolveRequestCredential(request); |
| 871 | if (!credential?.token) { |
| 872 | return Effect.fail(new ServerAuthMissingCredentialError({})); |
| 873 | } |
| 874 | if ( |
| 875 | isBrowserCookieCredential(credential.source) && |
| 876 | !isBrowserOriginAllowed(request, trustedBrowserOrigins) |
| 877 | ) { |
| 878 | return Effect.fail( |
| 879 | new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ |
| 880 | diagnostic: "Browser sessions are only accepted from the app's own origin.", |
| 881 | }), |
| 882 | ); |
| 883 | } |
| 884 | return authenticateToken(credential.token).pipe( |
| 885 | Effect.flatMap((session) => { |
| 886 | if (session.proofKeyThumbprint) { |
| 887 | if (!dpopToken || dpopToken !== credential.token) { |
| 888 | return Effect.fail( |
| 889 | new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ |
| 890 | diagnostic: "DPoP-bound access token requires DPoP authorization.", |
| 891 | dpopFailureReason: "invalid_proof", |
| 892 | }), |
| 893 | ); |
| 894 | } |
| 895 | return verifyRequestDpopProof({ |
| 896 | request, |
| 897 | expectedThumbprint: session.proofKeyThumbprint, |
| 898 | expectedAccessToken: dpopToken, |
| 899 | }).pipe( |
| 900 | Effect.provideService(ServerSecretStore.ServerSecretStore, secretStore), |
| 901 | Effect.provideService(Digest.Digest, digest), |
| 902 | Effect.as(session), |
| 903 | ); |
| 904 | } |
| 905 | if (dpopToken) { |
| 906 | return Effect.fail( |
| 907 | new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ |
| 908 | diagnostic: "DPoP authorization requires a proof-bound access token.", |
| 909 | dpopFailureReason: "invalid_proof", |
| 910 | }), |
| 911 | ); |
| 912 | } |
| 913 | return Effect.succeed(session); |
| 914 | }), |
| 915 | ); |
| 916 | }; |
| 917 | |
| 918 | const getSessionState: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["getSessionState"] = (request) => |
| 919 | authenticateRequest(request).pipe( |
| 920 | Effect.map( |
| 921 | (session) => |
| 922 | ({ |
| 923 | authenticated: true, |
| 924 | auth: descriptor, |
| 925 | ...authScopeResponse(session.scopes), |
| 926 | sessionMethod: session.method, |
| 927 | ...(session.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: DateTime.toUtc(session.expiresAt) } : {}), |
| 928 | }) satisfies AuthSessionState, |
| 929 | ), |
| 930 | Effect.catchIf(isServerAuthCredentialError, () => |
| 931 | Effect.succeed({ |
| 932 | authenticated: false, |
| 933 | auth: descriptor, |
| 934 | } satisfies AuthSessionState), |
| 935 | ), |
| 936 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.getSessionState"), |
| 937 | ); |
| 938 | |
| 939 | const createBrowserSession: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["createBrowserSession"] = Effect.fn( |
| 940 | "EnvironmentAuth.createBrowserSession", |
| 941 | )(function* (credential, requestMetadata, previousSessionToken) { |
| 942 | if (devAuth?.matches(credential)) { |
| 943 | return yield* sessions.verify(credential).pipe( |
| 944 | mapSessionVerificationErrors, |
| 945 | Effect.flatMap((session) => |
| 946 | DateTime.now.pipe( |
| 947 | Effect.map( |
| 948 | (now) => |
| 949 | ({ |
| 950 | response: { |
| 951 | authenticated: true, |
| 952 | ...authScopeResponse(session.scopes), |
| 953 | sessionMethod: session.method, |
| 954 | expiresAt: DateTime.toUtc(DateTime.add(now, { days: 30 })), |
| 955 | } satisfies AuthBrowserSessionResult, |
| 956 | sessionToken: credential, |
| 957 | cookieName: devAuth.cookieName, |
| 958 | expireNormalCookie: true, |
| 959 | }) satisfies BootstrapExchangeResult, |
| 960 | ), |
| 961 | ), |
| 962 | ), |
| 963 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.createBrowserSession"), |
| 964 | ); |
| 965 | } |
| 966 | const previousSession = |
| 967 | previousSessionToken === undefined |
| 968 | ? undefined |
| 969 | : yield* sessions.verify(previousSessionToken).pipe( |
| 970 | Effect.catchIf(SessionStore.isSessionCredentialInvalidError, () => Effect.void), |
| 971 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthSessionCredentialValidationError({ cause })), |
| 972 | ); |
| 973 | const grant = yield* bootstrapCredentials |
| 974 | .consume(credential) |
| 975 | .pipe(Effect.mapError(toBootstrapExchangeError)); |
| 976 | const session = yield* sessions |
| 977 | .issue({ |
| 978 | method: "browser-session-cookie", |
| 979 | subject: grant.subject, |
| 980 | scopes: grant.scopes, |
| 981 | ...(previousSession?.method === "browser-session-cookie" |
| 982 | ? { replaceSessionId: previousSession.sessionId } |
| 983 | : {}), |
| 984 | client: { |
| 985 | ...requestMetadata, |
| 986 | ...(grant.label ? { label: grant.label } : {}), |
| 987 | }, |
| 988 | }) |
| 989 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthAuthenticatedSessionIssueError({ cause }))); |
| 990 | return { |
| 991 | response: { |
| 992 | authenticated: true, |
| 993 | ...authScopeResponse(session.scopes), |
| 994 | sessionMethod: session.method, |
| 995 | expiresAt: DateTime.toUtc(session.expiresAt), |
| 996 | } satisfies AuthBrowserSessionResult, |
| 997 | sessionToken: session.token, |
| 998 | } satisfies BootstrapExchangeResult; |
| 999 | }); |
| 1000 | |
| 1001 | type ResolvedBootstrapGrant = Pick< |
| 1002 | PairingGrantStore.BootstrapGrant, |
| 1003 | "scopes" | "subject" | "label" |
| 1004 | > & { |
| 1005 | readonly method: PairingGrantStore.BootstrapGrant["method"] | "reusable-dev-token"; |
| 1006 | }; |
| 1007 | const resolveBootstrapGrant = ( |
| 1008 | credential: string, |
| 1009 | input?: { |
| 1010 | readonly proofKeyThumbprint?: string; |
| 1011 | readonly requestedScopes?: ReadonlyArray<AuthEnvironmentScope>; |
| 1012 | readonly requiredScopes?: ReadonlyArray<AuthEnvironmentScope>; |
| 1013 | readonly allowedSubject?: string; |
| 1014 | /** Shown to approvers when the credential waits on T3 Connect device approval. */ |
| 1015 | readonly requestMetadata?: AuthClientMetadata; |
| 1016 | }, |
| 1017 | ): Effect.Effect< |
| 1018 | ResolvedBootstrapGrant, |
| 1019 | | ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError |
| 1020 | | ServerAuthInternalError |
| 1021 | | ServerAuthScopeNotGrantedError |
| 1022 | | ServerAuthConnectApprovalPendingError |
| 1023 | > => { |
| 1024 | if (!devAuth?.matches(credential)) { |
| 1025 | return bootstrapCredentials.consume(credential, input).pipe( |
| 1026 | Effect.catchTags({ |
| 1027 | BootstrapCredentialConnectApprovalPendingError: (pending) => |
| 1028 | recordConnectRequest(pending.pairingLinkId, input?.requestMetadata).pipe( |
| 1029 | Effect.andThen(Effect.fail(new ServerAuthConnectApprovalPendingError({}))), |
| 1030 | ), |
| 1031 | }), |
| 1032 | Effect.mapError((cause) => |
| 1033 | cause._tag === "BootstrapCredentialScopeNotGrantedError" |
| 1034 | ? new ServerAuthScopeNotGrantedError({}) |
| 1035 | : cause._tag === "ServerAuthConnectApprovalPendingError" || |
| 1036 | cause._tag === "ServerAuthConnectDevicesError" |
| 1037 | ? cause |
| 1038 | : toBootstrapExchangeError(cause), |
| 1039 | ), |
| 1040 | ); |
| 1041 | } |
| 1042 | return sessions.verify(credential).pipe( |
| 1043 | mapSessionVerificationErrors, |
| 1044 | Effect.filterOrFail( |
| 1045 | (session) => |
| 1046 | input?.requiredScopes === undefined || |
| 1047 | input.requiredScopes.every((scope) => session.scopes.includes(scope)), |
| 1048 | () => new ServerAuthScopeNotGrantedError({}), |
| 1049 | ), |
| 1050 | Effect.map( |
| 1051 | (session) => |
| 1052 | ({ |
| 1053 | method: "reusable-dev-token", |
| 1054 | scopes: session.scopes, |
| 1055 | subject: "reusable-dev-token-child", |
| 1056 | }) satisfies ResolvedBootstrapGrant, |
| 1057 | ), |
| 1058 | ); |
| 1059 | }; |
| 1060 | |
| 1061 | // T3 Connect credential issuance, DPoP exchanges and device revocation take turns. Two mints |
| 1062 | // at once would open two requests with one code, and a revoke landing between an exchange |
| 1063 | // spending its credential and trusting the key would be undone by that exchange. |
| 1064 | const connectTrustLock = yield* Semaphore.make(1); |
| 1065 | |
| 1066 | const toAccessTokenResult = (session: SessionStore.IssuedSession) => |
| 1067 | DateTime.now.pipe( |
| 1068 | Effect.map( |
| 1069 | (now) => |
| 1070 | ({ |
| 1071 | access_token: session.token, |
| 1072 | issued_token_type: AuthAccessTokenType, |
| 1073 | token_type: session.proofKeyThumbprint ? "DPoP" : "Bearer", |
| 1074 | expires_in: Math.max( |
| 1075 | 0, |
| 1076 | Math.floor((session.expiresAt.epochMilliseconds - now.epochMilliseconds) / 1000), |
| 1077 | ), |
| 1078 | scope: encodeOAuthScope(session.scopes), |
| 1079 | }) satisfies AuthAccessTokenResult, |
| 1080 | ), |
| 1081 | ); |
| 1082 | |
| 1083 | const renewAccessToken: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["renewAccessToken"] = Effect.fn( |
| 1084 | "EnvironmentAuth.renewAccessToken", |
| 1085 | )(function* (accessToken, proofKeyThumbprint, consumeProof) { |
| 1086 | const session = yield* sessions |
| 1087 | .renew(accessToken, { |
| 1088 | proofKeyThumbprint, |
| 1089 | ttl: RENEWABLE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL, |
| 1090 | renewalWindow: RENEWABLE_SESSION_WINDOW, |
| 1091 | consumeProof, |
| 1092 | }) |
| 1093 | .pipe( |
| 1094 | Effect.mapError((cause) => |
| 1095 | isServerAuthCredentialError(cause) || isServerAuthInternalError(cause) |
| 1096 | ? cause |
| 1097 | : toSessionVerificationError(cause), |
| 1098 | ), |
| 1099 | ); |
| 1100 | return yield* toAccessTokenResult(session); |
| 1101 | }); |
| 1102 | |
| 1103 | const exchangeBootstrapCredentialForAccessToken: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["exchangeBootstrapCredentialForAccessToken"] = |
| 1104 | (credential, requestedScopes, requestMetadata, input) => { |
| 1105 | return resolveBootstrapGrant(credential, { |
| 1106 | ...input, |
| 1107 | requestMetadata, |
| 1108 | ...(requestedScopes !== undefined ? { requestedScopes } : {}), |
| 1109 | }).pipe( |
| 1110 | // Every T3 Connect key that gets in is remembered, so turning approval on later |
| 1111 | // keeps the devices already in use and lists them for review. |
| 1112 | Effect.tap((grant) => |
| 1113 | grant.subject === CLOUD_CONNECT_SUBJECT && input?.proofKeyThumbprint |
| 1114 | ? bootstrapCredentials |
| 1115 | .trustConnectDevice(input.proofKeyThumbprint, requestMetadata) |
| 1116 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthConnectDevicesError({ cause }))) |
| 1117 | : Effect.void, |
| 1118 | ), |
| 1119 | Effect.flatMap((grant) => |
| 1120 | Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 1121 | const grantedScopes = |
| 1122 | requestedScopes === undefined |
| 1123 | ? grant.scopes |
| 1124 | : [...new Set(requestedScopes)].filter((scope) => grant.scopes.includes(scope)); |
| 1125 | if (grantedScopes.length === 0) { |
| 1126 | return yield* new ServerAuthScopeNotGrantedError({}); |
| 1127 | } |
| 1128 | // Only plain pairing links renew. T3 Connect, CLI, desktop and peer sessions keep |
| 1129 | // their own lifetimes, so unlinking Connect or rotating a credential still cuts off. |
| 1130 | const renewable = |
| 1131 | input?.proofKeyThumbprint !== undefined && |
| 1132 | grant.method === "one-time-token" && |
| 1133 | grant.subject === PAIRING_LINK_SUBJECT; |
| 1134 | return yield* sessions |
| 1135 | .issue({ |
| 1136 | method: input?.proofKeyThumbprint ? "dpop-access-token" : "bearer-access-token", |
| 1137 | subject: grant.subject, |
| 1138 | scopes: grantedScopes, |
| 1139 | ...(input?.proofKeyThumbprint |
| 1140 | ? { |
| 1141 | proofKeyThumbprint: input.proofKeyThumbprint, |
| 1142 | ttl: renewable ? RENEWABLE_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL : Duration.hours(1), |
| 1143 | } |
| 1144 | : {}), |
| 1145 | ...(renewable ? { renewalWindow: RENEWABLE_SESSION_WINDOW } : {}), |
| 1146 | replaceActiveForSubjectAndMethod: grant.method === "desktop-bootstrap", |
| 1147 | client: { |
| 1148 | ...requestMetadata, |
| 1149 | ...(grant.label ? { label: grant.label } : {}), |
| 1150 | }, |
| 1151 | }) |
| 1152 | .pipe( |
| 1153 | Effect.mapError( |
| 1154 | (cause) => new ServerAuthAuthenticatedAccessTokenIssueError({ cause }), |
| 1155 | ), |
| 1156 | ); |
| 1157 | }), |
| 1158 | ), |
| 1159 | Effect.flatMap(toAccessTokenResult), |
| 1160 | (exchange) => |
| 1161 | input?.proofKeyThumbprint ? connectTrustLock.withPermits(1)(exchange) : exchange, |
| 1162 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.exchangeBootstrapCredentialForAccessToken"), |
| 1163 | ); |
| 1164 | }; |
| 1165 | |
| 1166 | const toPairingCredential = (issued: IssuedPairingLink): AuthPairingCredentialResult => ({ |
| 1167 | id: issued.id, |
| 1168 | credential: issued.credential, |
| 1169 | ...(issued.label ? { label: issued.label } : {}), |
| 1170 | expiresAt: issued.expiresAt, |
| 1171 | }); |
| 1172 | |
| 1173 | const issuePairingLink = Effect.fn("EnvironmentAuth.issuePairingLink")( |
| 1174 | function* (input: Parameters<EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["createPairingLink"]>[0]) { |
| 1175 | const createdAt = yield* DateTime.now; |
| 1176 | const issued = yield* bootstrapCredentials.issueOneTimeToken({ |
| 1177 | scopes: input?.scopes ?? AuthStandardClientScopes, |
| 1178 | subject: input?.subject ?? "one-time-token", |
| 1179 | ...(input?.ttl ? { ttl: input.ttl } : {}), |
| 1180 | ...(input?.label ? { label: input.label } : {}), |
| 1181 | ...(input?.proofKeyThumbprint ? { proofKeyThumbprint: input.proofKeyThumbprint } : {}), |
| 1182 | ...(input?.purpose ? { purpose: input.purpose } : {}), |
| 1183 | ...(input?.mcpApproval ? { mcpApproval: input.mcpApproval } : {}), |
| 1184 | ...(input?.requiresConnectApproval ? { requiresConnectApproval: true } : {}), |
| 1185 | }); |
| 1186 | return { |
| 1187 | id: issued.id, |
| 1188 | credential: issued.credential, |
| 1189 | scopes: input?.scopes ?? AuthStandardClientScopes, |
| 1190 | subject: input?.subject ?? "one-time-token", |
| 1191 | ...(issued.label ? { label: issued.label } : {}), |
| 1192 | createdAt: DateTime.toUtc(createdAt), |
| 1193 | expiresAt: DateTime.toUtc(issued.expiresAt), |
| 1194 | } satisfies IssuedPairingLink; |
| 1195 | }, |
| 1196 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthPairingLinkCreationError({ cause })), |
| 1197 | ); |
| 1198 | |
| 1199 | const createPairingLink: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["createPairingLink"] = Effect.fn( |
| 1200 | "EnvironmentAuth.createPairingLink", |
| 1201 | )(function* (input) { |
| 1202 | // The startup link is for a browser on this machine; every other link lets a device pair. |
| 1203 | if (input?.purpose !== "startup" && !ManagedLimits.allowsRemoteClients(managedPolicy)) { |
| 1204 | return yield* ManagedLimits.refuseRemoteClients( |
| 1205 | managedPolicy, |
| 1206 | "so this server cannot create pairing links", |
| 1207 | ); |
| 1208 | } |
| 1209 | return yield* issuePairingLink(input); |
| 1210 | }); |
| 1211 | |
| 1212 | const listPairingLinks: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["listPairingLinks"] = (input) => |
| 1213 | bootstrapCredentials.listActive().pipe( |
| 1214 | Effect.map((pairingLinks) => { |
| 1215 | const excludedSubjects = input?.excludeSubjects ?? [ |
| 1216 | INTERNAL_ADMINISTRATIVE_BOOTSTRAP_SUBJECT, |
| 1217 | ]; |
| 1218 | return pairingLinks |
| 1219 | .filter( |
| 1220 | (pairingLink) => |
| 1221 | !excludedSubjects.includes(pairingLink.subject) && |
| 1222 | !pairingLink.subject.startsWith(MCP_APPROVAL_SUBJECT_PREFIX), |
| 1223 | ) |
| 1224 | .map((link) => ({ ...link, ...authScopeResponse(link.scopes) })) |
| 1225 | .toSorted( |
| 1226 | (left, right) => right.createdAt.epochMilliseconds - left.createdAt.epochMilliseconds, |
| 1227 | ); |
| 1228 | }), |
| 1229 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthPairingLinksListError({ cause })), |
| 1230 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.listPairingLinks"), |
| 1231 | ); |
| 1232 | |
| 1233 | const revokePairingLink: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["revokePairingLink"] = (id) => |
| 1234 | bootstrapCredentials.revoke(id).pipe( |
| 1235 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthPairingLinkRevocationError({ cause })), |
| 1236 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.revokePairingLink"), |
| 1237 | ); |
| 1238 | |
| 1239 | const recordConnectRequest = (pairingLinkId: string, client: AuthClientMetadata | undefined) => |
| 1240 | client === undefined |
| 1241 | ? Effect.void |
| 1242 | : bootstrapCredentials |
| 1243 | .recordConnectRequestClient(pairingLinkId, client) |
| 1244 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthConnectDevicesError({ cause }))); |
| 1245 | |
| 1246 | const issueConnectCredential: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["issueConnectCredential"] = Effect.fn( |
| 1247 | "EnvironmentAuth.issueConnectCredential", |
| 1248 | )(function* ({ proofKeyThumbprint, requireApproval }) { |
| 1249 | return yield* issueConnectCredentialLocked({ proofKeyThumbprint, requireApproval }).pipe( |
| 1250 | connectTrustLock.withPermits(1), |
| 1251 | ); |
| 1252 | }); |
| 1253 | // Untraced: the issueConnectCredential span above already covers it. |
| 1254 | const issueConnectCredentialLocked = Effect.fnUntraced(function* ({ |
| 1255 | proofKeyThumbprint, |
| 1256 | requireApproval, |
| 1257 | }: Parameters<EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["issueConnectCredential"]>[0]) { |
| 1258 | const mustWait = |
| 1259 | requireApproval && |
| 1260 | !(yield* bootstrapCredentials |
| 1261 | .isConnectDeviceTrusted(proofKeyThumbprint) |
| 1262 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthConnectDevicesError({ cause })))); |
| 1263 | if (mustWait) { |
| 1264 | const pending = yield* bootstrapCredentials |
| 1265 | .findPendingConnect(proofKeyThumbprint) |
| 1266 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthConnectDevicesError({ cause }))); |
| 1267 | if (Option.isSome(pending)) { |
| 1268 | return { credential: pending.value.credential, expiresAt: pending.value.expiresAt }; |
| 1269 | } |
| 1270 | } |
| 1271 | const issued = yield* createPairingLink({ |
| 1272 | scopes: AuthStandardClientScopes, |
| 1273 | subject: CLOUD_CONNECT_SUBJECT, |
| 1274 | // Long enough for someone to notice the request and approve it. |
| 1275 | ttl: mustWait ? Duration.minutes(10) : Duration.minutes(2), |
| 1276 | label: "T3 Connect", |
| 1277 | proofKeyThumbprint, |
| 1278 | ...(mustWait ? { requiresConnectApproval: true } : {}), |
| 1279 | }); |
| 1280 | return { credential: issued.credential, expiresAt: issued.expiresAt }; |
| 1281 | }); |
| 1282 | |
| 1283 | const approveConnectDevice: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["approveConnectDevice"] = ( |
| 1284 | pairingLinkId, |
| 1285 | ) => |
| 1286 | bootstrapCredentials.approveConnectRequest(pairingLinkId).pipe( |
| 1287 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthConnectDevicesError({ cause })), |
| 1288 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.approveConnectDevice"), |
| 1289 | ); |
| 1290 | |
| 1291 | const connectRequestsShowingCode: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["connectRequestsShowingCode"] = |
| 1292 | Effect.fn("EnvironmentAuth.connectRequestsShowingCode")(function* (verificationCode) { |
| 1293 | const wanted = normalizeVerificationCode(verificationCode); |
| 1294 | const links = yield* bootstrapCredentials |
| 1295 | .listActive() |
| 1296 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthPairingLinksListError({ cause }))); |
| 1297 | return links.flatMap((link) => |
| 1298 | link.connectDeviceRequest !== undefined && |
| 1299 | normalizeVerificationCode(link.connectDeviceRequest.verificationCode) === wanted |
| 1300 | ? [link.id] |
| 1301 | : [], |
| 1302 | ); |
| 1303 | }); |
| 1304 | |
| 1305 | const listConnectDevices: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["listConnectDevices"] = () => |
| 1306 | bootstrapCredentials.listConnectDevices().pipe( |
| 1307 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthConnectDevicesError({ cause })), |
| 1308 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.listConnectDevices"), |
| 1309 | ); |
| 1310 | |
| 1311 | const revokeConnectDevice: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["revokeConnectDevice"] = Effect.fn( |
| 1312 | "EnvironmentAuth.revokeConnectDevice", |
| 1313 | )(function* (proofKeyThumbprint) { |
| 1314 | return yield* Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 1315 | const removed = yield* bootstrapCredentials |
| 1316 | .revokeConnectDevice(proofKeyThumbprint) |
| 1317 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthConnectDevicesError({ cause }))); |
| 1318 | const revokedSessions = yield* sessions |
| 1319 | .revokeByProofKey(proofKeyThumbprint) |
| 1320 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthSessionRevocationError({ cause }))); |
| 1321 | return removed || revokedSessions > 0; |
| 1322 | }).pipe(connectTrustLock.withPermits(1)); |
| 1323 | }); |
| 1324 | |
| 1325 | const connectDevicesShowingCode: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["connectDevicesShowingCode"] = |
| 1326 | Effect.fn("EnvironmentAuth.connectDevicesShowingCode")(function* (verificationCode) { |
| 1327 | const wanted = normalizeVerificationCode(verificationCode); |
| 1328 | return (yield* listConnectDevices()).filter( |
| 1329 | (device) => normalizeVerificationCode(device.verificationCode) === wanted, |
| 1330 | ); |
| 1331 | }); |
| 1332 | |
| 1333 | const issueSession: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["issueSession"] = (input) => |
| 1334 | sessions |
| 1335 | .issue({ |
| 1336 | subject: input?.subject ?? DEFAULT_SESSION_SUBJECT, |
| 1337 | method: "bearer-access-token", |
| 1338 | scopes: input?.scopes ?? AuthStandardClientScopes, |
| 1339 | client: { |
| 1340 | ...(input?.label ? { label: input.label } : {}), |
| 1341 | deviceType: "bot", |
| 1342 | }, |
| 1343 | ...(input?.ttl ? { ttl: input.ttl } : {}), |
| 1344 | }) |
| 1345 | .pipe( |
| 1346 | Effect.map( |
| 1347 | (issued) => |
| 1348 | ({ |
| 1349 | sessionId: issued.sessionId, |
| 1350 | token: issued.token, |
| 1351 | method: "bearer-access-token", |
| 1352 | scopes: issued.scopes, |
| 1353 | subject: input?.subject ?? DEFAULT_SESSION_SUBJECT, |
| 1354 | client: issued.client, |
| 1355 | expiresAt: DateTime.toUtc(issued.expiresAt), |
| 1356 | }) satisfies IssuedBearerSession, |
| 1357 | ), |
| 1358 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthSessionTokenIssueError({ cause })), |
| 1359 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.issueSession"), |
| 1360 | ); |
| 1361 | |
| 1362 | const listSessions: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["listSessions"] = () => |
| 1363 | sessions.listActive().pipe( |
| 1364 | Effect.map((activeSessions) => activeSessions.toSorted(bySessionPriority)), |
| 1365 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthSessionsListError({ cause })), |
| 1366 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.listSessions"), |
| 1367 | ); |
| 1368 | |
| 1369 | const revokeSession: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["revokeSession"] = (sessionId) => |
| 1370 | sessions.revoke(sessionId).pipe( |
| 1371 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthSessionRevocationError({ cause })), |
| 1372 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.revokeSession"), |
| 1373 | ); |
| 1374 | |
| 1375 | const revokeOtherSessionsExcept = (sessionId: AuthSessionId) => |
| 1376 | sessions.revokeAllExcept(sessionId).pipe( |
| 1377 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthOtherSessionsRevocationError({ cause })), |
| 1378 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.revokeOtherSessionsExcept"), |
| 1379 | ); |
| 1380 | |
| 1381 | const issuePairingCredential: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["issuePairingCredential"] = (input) => |
| 1382 | createPairingLink({ |
| 1383 | scopes: input?.access |
| 1384 | ? mcpClientScopes(input.access) |
| 1385 | : (input?.scopes ?? AuthStandardClientScopes), |
| 1386 | subject: |
| 1387 | input?.purpose === "peer-link" && input.access |
| 1388 | ? `${PEER_LINK_PAIRING_SUBJECT_PREFIX}${input.access}` |
| 1389 | : "one-time-token", |
| 1390 | ...(input?.label ? { label: input.label } : {}), |
| 1391 | ...(input?.access && input.purpose !== "peer-link" ? { mcpApproval: input.access } : {}), |
| 1392 | }).pipe( |
| 1393 | Effect.map((issued) => ({ |
| 1394 | ...toPairingCredential(issued), |
| 1395 | ...(input?.access ? { access: input.access } : {}), |
| 1396 | ...(input?.access && input.purpose === "peer-link" ? { purpose: input.purpose } : {}), |
| 1397 | })), |
| 1398 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.issuePairingCredential"), |
| 1399 | ); |
| 1400 | |
| 1401 | const issueStartupPairingCredential: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["issueStartupPairingCredential"] = |
| 1402 | () => { |
| 1403 | // Unguarded: startup already refused auth policies the managed policy leaves out. |
| 1404 | const fallback = issuePairingLink({ |
| 1405 | scopes: AuthAdministrativeClientScopes, |
| 1406 | subject: INTERNAL_ADMINISTRATIVE_BOOTSTRAP_SUBJECT, |
| 1407 | purpose: "startup", |
| 1408 | }).pipe(Effect.map(toPairingCredential)); |
| 1409 | if (!devAuth) { |
| 1410 | return fallback.pipe(Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.issueStartupPairingCredential")); |
| 1411 | } |
| 1412 | return sessions.verify(devAuth.credential).pipe( |
| 1413 | Effect.map( |
| 1414 | (session) => |
| 1415 | ({ |
| 1416 | id: session.sessionId, |
| 1417 | credential: devAuth.credential, |
| 1418 | label: "Reusable dev token", |
| 1419 | expiresAt: DateTime.toUtc(session.expiresAt ?? REUSABLE_DEV_SESSION_EXPIRES_AT), |
| 1420 | }) satisfies AuthPairingCredentialResult, |
| 1421 | ), |
| 1422 | Effect.catch((cause) => |
| 1423 | SessionStore.isSessionCredentialInvalidError(cause) |
| 1424 | ? fallback |
| 1425 | : Effect.fail(new ServerAuthPairingLinkCreationError({ cause })), |
| 1426 | ), |
| 1427 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.issueStartupPairingCredential"), |
| 1428 | ); |
| 1429 | }; |
| 1430 | |
| 1431 | const listClientSessions: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["listClientSessions"] = (currentSessionId) => |
| 1432 | listSessions().pipe( |
| 1433 | Effect.map((clientSessions) => |
| 1434 | clientSessions.map((clientSession): AuthClientSession => ({ |
| 1435 | ...clientSession, |
| 1436 | ...authScopeResponse(clientSession.scopes), |
| 1437 | current: clientSession.sessionId === currentSessionId, |
| 1438 | })), |
| 1439 | ), |
| 1440 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.listClientSessions"), |
| 1441 | ); |
| 1442 | |
| 1443 | const proofKeyOf = (sessionId: AuthSessionId) => |
| 1444 | sessions |
| 1445 | .proofKeyThumbprintOf(sessionId) |
| 1446 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthSessionRevocationError({ cause }))); |
| 1447 | |
| 1448 | const revokeClient: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["revokeClient"] = Effect.fn( |
| 1449 | "EnvironmentAuth.revokeClient", |
| 1450 | )(function* (sessionId) { |
| 1451 | // A T3 Connect device would otherwise mint itself a new session right away. |
| 1452 | return yield* Option.match(yield* proofKeyOf(sessionId), { |
| 1453 | onNone: () => revokeSession(sessionId), |
| 1454 | onSome: revokeConnectDevice, |
| 1455 | }); |
| 1456 | }); |
| 1457 | |
| 1458 | const revokeClientSession: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["revokeClientSession"] = Effect.fn( |
| 1459 | "EnvironmentAuth.revokeClientSession", |
| 1460 | )(function* (currentSessionId, targetSessionId) { |
| 1461 | if (currentSessionId === targetSessionId) { |
| 1462 | return yield* new ServerAuthForbiddenOperationError({}); |
| 1463 | } |
| 1464 | const targetProofKey = Option.getOrUndefined(yield* proofKeyOf(targetSessionId)); |
| 1465 | // Revoking the caller's own device would cut off the caller too. |
| 1466 | if ( |
| 1467 | targetProofKey !== undefined && |
| 1468 | Option.getOrUndefined(yield* proofKeyOf(currentSessionId)) === targetProofKey |
| 1469 | ) { |
| 1470 | return yield* revokeSession(targetSessionId); |
| 1471 | } |
| 1472 | return yield* revokeClient(targetSessionId); |
| 1473 | }); |
| 1474 | |
| 1475 | const revokeOtherClientSessions: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["revokeOtherClientSessions"] = |
| 1476 | Effect.fn("EnvironmentAuth.revokeOtherClientSessions")(function* (currentSessionId) { |
| 1477 | const currentProofKey = yield* sessions |
| 1478 | .proofKeyThumbprintOf(currentSessionId) |
| 1479 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthOtherSessionsRevocationError({ cause }))); |
| 1480 | return yield* Effect.gen(function* () { |
| 1481 | yield* bootstrapCredentials |
| 1482 | .revokeConnectDevicesExcept(Option.getOrNull(currentProofKey)) |
| 1483 | .pipe(Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthConnectDevicesError({ cause }))); |
| 1484 | return yield* revokeOtherSessionsExcept(currentSessionId); |
| 1485 | }).pipe(connectTrustLock.withPermits(1)); |
| 1486 | }); |
| 1487 | |
| 1488 | const issueStartupPairingUrl: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["issueStartupPairingUrl"] = (baseUrl) => |
| 1489 | issueStartupPairingCredential().pipe( |
| 1490 | Effect.map((issued) => { |
| 1491 | const url = new URL(baseUrl); |
| 1492 | url.pathname = "/pair"; |
| 1493 | url.searchParams.delete("token"); |
| 1494 | url.hash = new URLSearchParams([["token", issued.credential]]).toString(); |
| 1495 | return url.toString(); |
| 1496 | }), |
| 1497 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.issueStartupPairingUrl"), |
| 1498 | ); |
| 1499 | |
| 1500 | // Only the RPC socket's ticket is bound to the client's proof key. The media |
| 1501 | // routes reuse one ticket across <img>, EventSource and several sockets, and |
| 1502 | // each of those would need its own single-use proof. |
| 1503 | const issueWebSocketTicket: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["issueWebSocketTicket"] = ( |
| 1504 | session, |
| 1505 | input, |
| 1506 | ) => |
| 1507 | sessions |
| 1508 | .issueWebSocketToken(session.sessionId, { |
| 1509 | ...(input?.use ? { audience: input.use } : {}), |
| 1510 | ...(input?.use === "rpc" && session.proofKeyThumbprint |
| 1511 | ? { proofKeyThumbprint: session.proofKeyThumbprint } |
| 1512 | : {}), |
| 1513 | }) |
| 1514 | .pipe( |
| 1515 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthWebSocketTokenIssueError({ cause })), |
| 1516 | Effect.map( |
| 1517 | (issued) => |
| 1518 | ({ |
| 1519 | ticket: Redacted.make(issued.token), |
| 1520 | expiresAt: DateTime.toUtc(issued.expiresAt), |
| 1521 | }) satisfies AuthWebSocketTicketResult, |
| 1522 | ), |
| 1523 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.issueWebSocketTicket"), |
| 1524 | ); |
| 1525 | |
| 1526 | const authenticateHttpRequest: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["authenticateHttpRequest"] = ( |
| 1527 | request, |
| 1528 | ) => |
| 1529 | authenticateRequest(request).pipe(Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.authenticateHttpRequest")); |
| 1530 | |
| 1531 | const authenticateWebSocketUpgrade: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["authenticateWebSocketUpgrade"] = |
| 1532 | Effect.fn("EnvironmentAuth.authenticateWebSocketUpgrade")(function* (request, use) { |
| 1533 | const url = requestUrl(request); |
| 1534 | if (Option.isSome(url)) { |
| 1535 | const query = yield* decodeWebSocketUpgradeQuery( |
| 1536 | Object.fromEntries(url.value.searchParams), |
| 1537 | ).pipe(Effect.orDie); |
| 1538 | const websocketTicket = query.wsTicket && Redacted.value(query.wsTicket); |
| 1539 | if (websocketTicket && websocketTicket.trim().length > 0) { |
| 1540 | const session = yield* sessions |
| 1541 | .verifyWebSocketToken(websocketTicket) |
| 1542 | .pipe(mapSessionVerificationErrors, Effect.flatMap(rejectMcpClientAudience)); |
| 1543 | if (session.audience !== undefined && session.audience !== use) { |
| 1544 | return yield* new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ |
| 1545 | diagnostic: `WebSocket ticket was issued for the ${session.audience} route.`, |
| 1546 | }); |
| 1547 | } |
| 1548 | if (session.proofKeyThumbprint) { |
| 1549 | // WebSocket clients cannot set headers, so the proof travels in the query. |
| 1550 | // The proof hashes the ticket; consuming its jti prevents replay after first use. |
| 1551 | // Only encrypted transport prevents an active interceptor from racing that use. |
| 1552 | const proof = request.headers.dpop ?? (query.dpop && Redacted.value(query.dpop)); |
| 1553 | if (!proof) { |
| 1554 | return yield* new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ |
| 1555 | diagnostic: "DPoP-bound WebSocket ticket requires a DPoP proof.", |
| 1556 | dpopFailureReason: "invalid_proof", |
| 1557 | }); |
| 1558 | } |
| 1559 | yield* verifyRequestDpopProof({ |
| 1560 | request, |
| 1561 | proof, |
| 1562 | expectedThumbprint: session.proofKeyThumbprint, |
| 1563 | expectedAccessToken: websocketTicket, |
| 1564 | }).pipe( |
| 1565 | Effect.provideService(ServerSecretStore.ServerSecretStore, secretStore), |
| 1566 | Effect.provideService(Digest.Digest, digest), |
| 1567 | ); |
| 1568 | } |
| 1569 | return { |
| 1570 | sessionId: session.sessionId, |
| 1571 | subject: session.subject, |
| 1572 | method: session.method, |
| 1573 | scopes: session.scopes, |
| 1574 | ...(session.proofKeyThumbprint |
| 1575 | ? { proofKeyThumbprint: session.proofKeyThumbprint } |
| 1576 | : {}), |
| 1577 | ...(session.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: session.expiresAt } : {}), |
| 1578 | }; |
| 1579 | } |
| 1580 | } |
| 1581 | |
| 1582 | return yield* authenticateRequest(request); |
| 1583 | }); |
| 1584 | |
| 1585 | /** The expiry of a verified peer link session, moved out when this use finds it a step short. */ |
| 1586 | const renewPeerLinkSession = Effect.fnUntraced(function* ( |
| 1587 | sessionId: AuthSessionId, |
| 1588 | expiresAt: DateTime.DateTime, |
| 1589 | ) { |
| 1590 | const now = yield* DateTime.now; |
| 1591 | const renewed = DateTime.add(now, { |
| 1592 | milliseconds: Duration.toMillis(MCP_CLIENT_SESSION_TTL), |
| 1593 | }); |
| 1594 | if (DateTime.distance(expiresAt, renewed).pipe(Duration.isLessThan(PEER_LINK_RENEWAL_STEP))) { |
| 1595 | return DateTime.toUtc(expiresAt); |
| 1596 | } |
| 1597 | const current = yield* sessions |
| 1598 | .extend(sessionId, renewed, PEER_LINK_RENEWAL_STEP) |
| 1599 | .pipe(mapSessionVerificationErrors); |
| 1600 | // A revoke can land between the verification and the update. |
| 1601 | if (Option.isNone(current)) { |
| 1602 | return yield* new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ |
| 1603 | diagnostic: "The peer link session ended before it could be renewed.", |
| 1604 | }); |
| 1605 | } |
| 1606 | return current.value; |
| 1607 | }); |
| 1608 | |
| 1609 | const authenticateMcpClient: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["authenticateMcpClient"] = (request) => { |
| 1610 | const token = parseBearerToken(request); |
| 1611 | if (token === null) return Effect.fail(new ServerAuthMissingCredentialError({})); |
| 1612 | return sessions.verify(token).pipe( |
| 1613 | mapSessionVerificationErrors, |
| 1614 | Effect.flatMap( |
| 1615 | Effect.fnUntraced(function* (session) { |
| 1616 | if (session.subject !== MCP_CLIENT_SUBJECT || session.method !== "bearer-access-token") { |
| 1617 | return yield* new ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError({ |
| 1618 | diagnostic: "Only MCP client sessions are accepted here.", |
| 1619 | }); |
| 1620 | } |
| 1621 | const client = { |
| 1622 | sessionId: session.sessionId, |
| 1623 | label: session.client.label ?? "MCP client", |
| 1624 | access: session.scopes.includes(AuthOrchestrationOperateScope) |
| 1625 | ? (session.runtimeModeCeiling ?? "approval-required") |
| 1626 | : "read-only", |
| 1627 | peerLink: session.peerLink === true, |
| 1628 | } satisfies McpClientSession; |
| 1629 | if (session.peerLink !== true || session.expiresAt === undefined) return client; |
| 1630 | return { |
| 1631 | ...client, |
| 1632 | linkExpiresAt: yield* renewPeerLinkSession(session.sessionId, session.expiresAt), |
| 1633 | } satisfies McpClientSession; |
| 1634 | }), |
| 1635 | ), |
| 1636 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.authenticateMcpClient"), |
| 1637 | ); |
| 1638 | }; |
| 1639 | |
| 1640 | const issueMcpClientSession: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["issueMcpClientSession"] = (input) => |
| 1641 | sessions |
| 1642 | .issue({ |
| 1643 | subject: MCP_CLIENT_SUBJECT, |
| 1644 | method: "bearer-access-token", |
| 1645 | scopes: mcpClientScopes(input.access), |
| 1646 | ttl: MCP_CLIENT_SESSION_TTL, |
| 1647 | ...(input.access === "read-only" ? {} : { runtimeModeCeiling: input.access }), |
| 1648 | peerLink: input.peerLink, |
| 1649 | client: { ...input.client, label: input.label, deviceType: "bot" }, |
| 1650 | }) |
| 1651 | .pipe( |
| 1652 | Effect.map((issued) => ({ |
| 1653 | sessionId: issued.sessionId, |
| 1654 | token: issued.token, |
| 1655 | expiresAt: issued.expiresAt, |
| 1656 | })), |
| 1657 | Effect.mapError((cause) => new ServerAuthSessionTokenIssueError({ cause })), |
| 1658 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.issueMcpClientSession"), |
| 1659 | ); |
| 1660 | |
| 1661 | const consumeMcpApprovalCode: EnvironmentAuth["Service"]["consumeMcpApprovalCode"] = ( |
| 1662 | code, |
| 1663 | access, |
| 1664 | peerLink = false, |
| 1665 | ) => |
| 1666 | resolveBootstrapGrant(code.trim(), { |
| 1667 | requiredScopes: mcpClientScopes(access), |
| 1668 | allowedSubject: `${peerLink ? PEER_LINK_PAIRING_SUBJECT_PREFIX : MCP_APPROVAL_SUBJECT_PREFIX}${access}`, |
| 1669 | }).pipe( |
| 1670 | Effect.catchTags({ |
| 1671 | ServerAuthInvalidCredentialError: () => |
| 1672 | Effect.fail(new ServerAuthMcpApprovalCodeError({ reason: "unknown_or_used" })), |
| 1673 | ServerAuthConnectApprovalPendingError: () => |
| 1674 | Effect.fail(new ServerAuthMcpApprovalCodeError({ reason: "unknown_or_used" })), |
| 1675 | ServerAuthScopeNotGrantedError: () => |
| 1676 | Effect.fail(new ServerAuthMcpApprovalCodeError({ reason: "insufficient_scope" })), |
| 1677 | }), |
| 1678 | Effect.flatMap((grant) => |
| 1679 | grant.method !== "one-time-token" && grant.method !== "reusable-dev-token" |
| 1680 | ? Effect.fail(new ServerAuthMcpApprovalCodeError({ reason: "not_a_pairing_code" })) |
| 1681 | : Effect.succeed(mcpApprovalLevel(grant.subject) ?? access), |
| 1682 | ), |
| 1683 | Effect.withSpan("EnvironmentAuth.consumeMcpApprovalCode"), |
| 1684 | ); |
| 1685 | |
| 1686 | yield* revokePairedClientsThePolicyDisallows(managedPolicy, { |
| 1687 | sessions, |
| 1688 | pairingLinks: bootstrapCredentials, |
| 1689 | }); |
| 1690 | |
| 1691 | return EnvironmentAuth.of({ |
| 1692 | getDescriptor: Effect.fn("EnvironmentAuth.getDescriptor")(function () { |
| 1693 | return Effect.succeed(descriptor); |
| 1694 | }), |
| 1695 | getSessionState, |
| 1696 | createBrowserSession, |
| 1697 | exchangeBootstrapCredentialForAccessToken, |
| 1698 | renewAccessToken, |
| 1699 | createPairingLink, |
| 1700 | issueConnectCredential, |
| 1701 | approveConnectDevice, |
| 1702 | connectRequestsShowingCode, |
| 1703 | listConnectDevices, |
| 1704 | revokeConnectDevice, |
| 1705 | connectDevicesShowingCode, |
| 1706 | issuePairingCredential, |
| 1707 | issueStartupPairingCredential, |
| 1708 | listPairingLinks, |
| 1709 | revokePairingLink, |
| 1710 | issueSession, |
| 1711 | listSessions, |
| 1712 | revokeSession, |
| 1713 | listClientSessions, |
| 1714 | revokeClient, |
| 1715 | revokeClientSession, |
| 1716 | revokeOtherClientSessions, |
| 1717 | authenticateHttpRequest, |
| 1718 | authenticateWebSocketUpgrade, |
| 1719 | issueWebSocketTicket, |
| 1720 | issueStartupPairingUrl, |
| 1721 | authenticateMcpClient, |
| 1722 | issueMcpClientSession, |
| 1723 | consumeMcpApprovalCode, |
| 1724 | }); |
| 1725 | }); |
| 1726 | |
| 1727 | const isMcpClientAccess = Schema.is(AuthMcpClientAccess); |
| 1728 | |
| 1729 | const normalizeVerificationCode = (code: string) => code.toUpperCase().replace(/[^0-9A-Z]/g, ""); |
| 1730 | |
| 1731 | /** The level an approval code's subject names, or undefined for any other code. */ |
| 1732 | const mcpApprovalLevel = (subject: string): AuthMcpClientAccess | undefined => { |
| 1733 | const level = subject.startsWith(MCP_APPROVAL_SUBJECT_PREFIX) |
| 1734 | ? subject.slice(MCP_APPROVAL_SUBJECT_PREFIX.length) |
| 1735 | : undefined; |
| 1736 | return isMcpClientAccess(level) ? level : undefined; |
| 1737 | }; |
| 1738 | |
| 1739 | /** Subjects of sessions and links a pairing link created, keyed by how the client paired. */ |
| 1740 | const LINK_PAIRED_SUBJECTS = { link: "one-time-token", connect: CLOUD_CONNECT_SUBJECT } as const; |
| 1741 | |
| 1742 | /** |
| 1743 | * Revokes sessions and unused links from pairing the policy no longer allows, so a policy rolled |
| 1744 | * out to a machine that already had phones paired takes effect on the next start. |
| 1745 | */ |
| 1746 | const revokePairedClientsThePolicyDisallows = Effect.fn( |
| 1747 | "EnvironmentAuth.revokePairedClientsThePolicyDisallows", |
| 1748 | )(function* ( |
| 1749 | policy: ManagedPolicy.ManagedPolicy["Service"], |
| 1750 | stores: { |
| 1751 | readonly sessions: SessionStore.SessionStore["Service"]; |
| 1752 | readonly pairingLinks: PairingGrantStore.PairingGrantStore["Service"]; |
| 1753 | }, |
| 1754 | ) { |
| 1755 | const remoteAllowed = ManagedLimits.allowsRemoteClients(policy); |
| 1756 | const disallowed = new Set<string>(); |
| 1757 | if (!remoteAllowed) disallowed.add(LINK_PAIRED_SUBJECTS.link); |
| 1758 | if (!ManagedLimits.allowsConnect(policy)) disallowed.add(LINK_PAIRED_SUBJECTS.connect); |
| 1759 | if (disallowed.size === 0) return; |
| 1760 | const sessions = (yield* stores.sessions.listActive()).filter( |
| 1761 | (session) => |
| 1762 | disallowed.has(session.subject) || |
| 1763 | // The startup link also pairs browsers on this machine; only a device elsewhere goes. |
| 1764 | (!remoteAllowed && |
| 1765 | session.subject === INTERNAL_ADMINISTRATIVE_BOOTSTRAP_SUBJECT && |
| 1766 | session.client.ipAddress !== undefined && |
| 1767 | !isLocalLoopbackHost(session.client.ipAddress)), |
| 1768 | ); |
| 1769 | const links = (yield* stores.pairingLinks.listActive()).filter( |
| 1770 | (link) => |
| 1771 | disallowed.has(link.subject) || |
| 1772 | // Approval codes let an agent elsewhere sign in, as plain codes do. |
| 1773 | (!remoteAllowed && link.subject.startsWith(MCP_APPROVAL_SUBJECT_PREFIX)), |
| 1774 | ); |
| 1775 | yield* Effect.forEach(sessions, (session) => stores.sessions.revoke(session.sessionId), { |
| 1776 | discard: true, |
| 1777 | }); |
| 1778 | yield* Effect.forEach(links, (link) => stores.pairingLinks.revoke(link.id), { discard: true }); |
| 1779 | if (sessions.length > 0 || links.length > 0) { |
| 1780 | yield* Effect.logInfo("Revoked clients the managed policy does not allow.", { |
| 1781 | sessions: sessions.length, |
| 1782 | pairingLinks: links.length, |
| 1783 | }); |
| 1784 | } |
| 1785 | }); |
| 1786 | |
| 1787 | export const layer = Layer.effect(EnvironmentAuth, make).pipe( |
| 1788 | Layer.provideMerge(PairingGrantStore.layer), |
| 1789 | Layer.provideMerge(SessionStore.layer), |
| 1790 | Layer.provideMerge(EnvironmentAuthPolicy.layer), |
| 1791 | ); |
| 1792 | |
| 1793 | const layerStorage = Layer.mergeAll(ServerSecretStore.layer, SqlitePersistence.layerCliConfig); |
| 1794 | |
| 1795 | export const layerRuntime = layer.pipe( |
| 1796 | Layer.provideMerge(ManagedPolicy.layer), |
| 1797 | Layer.provideMerge(layerStorage), |
| 1798 | Layer.provideMerge(ServerEnvironment.layerIdentity), |
| 1799 | ); |